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The Realities of Takings Litigation
Dave Owen*
This Article presents an empirical study of takings litigation
against the United States. It reviews the cohort of takings cases
filed against the federal government between 2000 and 2014,
tracing each case from filing through final disposition. The result
is a picture of takings litigation that is at odds with much of the
conventional wisdom of the field.
That conventional wisdom suggests that most takings cases
will involve alleged regulatory takings; that the most intellectually
challenging issues will arise within the field of regulatory takings;
and, more broadly, that takings litigation will play an important
role in the United States’ efforts to balance government regulation
against individual liberty. This Article instead reveals that most
takings litigation against the federal government involves alleged
physical takings; that key recurring questions involve the
selection of a method of takings analysis and the nature of property
rights rather than the nuances of regulatory takings standards;
and that takings litigation is only peripherally relevant to
relationships between federal regulators and most regulated
entities. These findings apply only to takings litigation against the
federal government; takings litigation against state and local
governments was not part of this study.
Even with that significant caveat, these findings demonstrate
the need to recalibrate the focus of takings theory and doctrine. At
a general level, they call for heightened attention to alleged
physical takings. More specifically, they call for more careful
policing of the boundaries between methods of takings analysis,
for more focus on the types of property rights that should receive
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takings protection, and for reexamination of the premise that almost
all physical takings claims should be subject to categorical analyses.
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INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states,
“nor shall private property be taken without just compensation.”
While jurists and academics have spent years debating what that
phrase means, they generally agree that it is crucially important.
Takings doctrine, according to the classic accounts, plays a central
role in the United States’ struggles to balance individual liberty
against collective regulation.1 The recurring narratives of takings
litigation reflect this framing. Supporters of takings claims tell of
singled-out individual property owners gamely standing up to an
1. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017).
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overbearing regulatory state.2 Regulations’ defenders, in contrast,
argue that takings litigants are often moneyed, powerful interests
seeking to pad their good fortune with taxpayer money, and to
undermine the democratically enacted regulatory systems upon
which healthy, safe, and just communities depend.3 Yet both sides
tend to agree that the stakes are high.
Beyond the importance of takings doctrine, several other points
of agreement have emerged among jurists and academics. One such
consensus point is that within the larger field of takings doctrine,
regulatory takings cases are predominant and particularly
important. Since 1978, when the United States Supreme Court
decided Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City,4
regulatory takings cases have dominated the Court’s takings
docket, and most academic articles focus on regulatory takings.5
Within that area of focus, Penn Central seemingly reigns supreme.
The Court has stated, and academics agree, that most takings cases
fall under the Penn Central standard,6 and much of the debate
centers on improving that standard—or, often, castigating it.7
Those critiques highlight a second point of near-consensus: for
decades, commentators and Supreme Court justices have described
takings doctrine as a confusing mess,8 and they often trace that
confusion to the amorphous standards and difficult policy

2. See, e.g., What We Fight For: Property Rights, PAC. LEGAL FOUND.,
https://pacificlegal.org/property-rights/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2021).
3. See generally Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical
Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 509 (1998)
(explaining threats posed by takings plaintiffs); J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition
of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 129–30 (1995).
4. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
5. See infra notes 86–95 and accompanying text.
6. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 32 (2012); Horne v.
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 377 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Most takings cases
therefore proceed under the fact-specific balancing test set out in [Penn Central].”).
7. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118
PENN ST. L. REV. 601, 602 (2014) (“[T]he doctrine has become a compilation of moving parts
that are neither individually coherent nor collectively compatible.”); Holly Doremus, Takings
and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 1, 7 (asserting that the Court’s regulatory takings
decisions since Penn Central “have sown nothing but confusion”).
8. See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078 & n.2 (1993) (asserting that “we
have a Takings Clause engulfed in confusion,” and compiling sources, spanning decades,
saying much the same thing).
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questions underlying regulatory takings disputes.9 Consequently,
the holy grail of takings theory has long been a predictable, efficient,
and fair way of resolving regulatory takings claims.10
But do these shared understandings align with the realities of
takings litigation? To a surprising extent, the existing literature
leaves that question unanswered. That literature is rich in theory;
“[t]he vast majority of takings articles,” as Eduardo Penalver has
accurately observed, “start with broad, normative theories and then
attempt to delineate the precise content of takings doctrine on the
basis of those theories.”11 But empirical analyses of takings
litigation are exceedingly rare.12 Additionally, the takings literature
tends to focus on United States Supreme Court cases, and the Court
reviews a few cases that interest it, not a representative sample of
lower–court actions. That means judges and commentators have
little information about whether the questions addressed in
high-profile Supreme Court cases and the associated academic
commentary align with the issues typically raised in routine takings
cases—or about whether the disparities, if they exist, matter.
To help fill these knowledge gaps, this Article studies the cohort
of takings claims filed in the United States Court of Federal Claims
(which hears nearly all takings cases filed against the federal
government)13 between 2000 and 2014. I recorded the subject matter
and tracked outcomes for all of the filed cases, which meant
determining whether those cases had been dismissed, resolved on
the merits, or settled. I also tracked which cases produced
just compensation payments, either through court awards or
9. E.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57
S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 593–94 (1984); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36,
37 (1964).
10. Many commentators have noted the Supreme Court’s apparent dissatisfaction
with its own takings jurisprudence and its unsuccessful quest for something better. See, e.g.,
Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1437 (1993) (noting that the Court “wants to
affirm the importance of property, but it cannot find a standard that will control regulatory
excess without threatening to bring down the whole regulatory apparatus of the modern
state”). For some scholars, that simple, efficient, and fair method would involve getting rid
of regulatory takings altogether. See Byrne, supra note 3.
11. Eduardo M. Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2186–87 (2004).
12. A notable exception is James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of
Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35 (2016).
13. For a more detailed explanation of the Court of Federal Claims’s role, see infra
notes 64–76 and accompanying text.
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settlements and how much money the plaintiffs received.
Additionally, I recorded what types of entities were bringing
takings claims, what types of law firms represented takings
plaintiffs, and which federal government entities’ activities
triggered the litigation. I coupled this analysis with a qualitative
review of decisions and filings from takings cases. The result is a
different, and in some ways more comprehensive, account of
takings litigation than anything in the existing literature.14
That methodology creates some limitations. Most importantly,
because sufficiently comprehensive records of complaints only
exist for federal-court litigation, I did not review state-court cases.
That means my data set excludes cases arising out of state and local
land use regulation, which is a primary concern for the United
States Supreme Court and commentators.15 It is possible that a
similar study of state-court litigation—if it were possible—would
produce similar results, but this study does not eliminate the
possibility that federal-takings litigation is just different.16
Additionally, I studied cases filed during a single fifteen-year
period. Takings litigation evolved during that period, and it almost
certainly evolved before and after. So while my conclusions may
support hypotheses about what takings litigation was like in the
1990s or what it will be like in years to come, those hypotheses
necessarily must be tentative.
Despite these caveats, several important conclusions emerge
from the analysis. First, within my pool of cases, regulatory takings
claims were much less prevalent than Supreme Court decisions and
most academic writing would lead one to expect. From 2000 to
2014,17 the vast majority of takings claims—and all but four of the
successful claims—against the federal government arose out of
14. To my knowledge, the only data set of comparable scope is Krier and Sterk’s. But
their data set is different in several important ways. Theirs includes only published decisions
in takings cases, which means it excludes cases that produce no published decision and does
not record case outcomes (which matters because parties sometimes win preliminary
decisions but do not ultimately obtain any relief). In that sense, their database is narrower
and less representative. Krier and Sterk’s data set is broader than mine in one key way: it
includes state-court cases. See generally Krier & Sterk, supra note 12.
15. See infra Table 1.
16. See infra notes 132–137 and accompanying text (elaborating on these limitations
but also noting potential parallels between federal- and state-court takings litigation).
17. I chose 2014 as an end date because takings cases often take many years to resolve,
particularly if the plaintiffs have credible claims, and more recent cases are less likely to have
been litigated to completion.
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alleged physical invasions or direct appropriations of property
interests, with most arising out of military airplane flights,
flooding, or conversions of railroad lines to recreational trails. The
regulatory activities that have been of primary interest to the
Supreme Court and academic commentators generated few claims.
Rarer still were cases that turn on the classic doctrinal analyses that
traditionally receive so much attention. Of the 472 cases in the pool,
only twenty-three appear to have turned on a Penn Central or Lucas
analysis, and not a single one turned on a Nollan18-Dolan19 analysis
of exactions.20 Physical takings claims overwhelmingly predominate.
Second, both traditional conservative and liberal narratives
align unevenly with the pool of takings cases against the federal
government. Liberal critics of takings litigation portray it as a
coordinated effort by established, wealthy interests to undercut the
regulatory state.21 Some conservatives have openly advocated such
an effort, though they would not limit it to a moneyed class.22 But
during the time period I studied, business and legal elites showed
little interest in takings claims against the federal government, and
most of the federal regulatory apparatus was essentially untouched
by takings litigation. Most claims were filed by individuals or small
businesses.23 Many cases were litigated pro se. Indeed, the
prototypical takings claim was filed by an individual, married
couple, or small business owner, brought as part of an aggregated
case in which dozens of plaintiffs participated, litigated by smallor mid-sized-firm lawyers based in Missouri, and targeted at fairly
obscure non-regulatory activities involving the conversion of old,
decrepit rail lines into recreational trails. At the federal level, at
least, takings litigation has become an eclectic sideshow to the
United States’ grand struggles over regulatory policy.
Third, the doctrinal questions raised in federal-court takings
litigation tend to differ from the questions upon which Supreme
Court justices and academics typically focus. When explaining its
focus on regulatory takings, the Court often states that per se
18. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
19. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
20. See infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text (summarizing takings doctrines
addressing exactions); infra note 143 and accompanying text (summarizing findings).
21. E.g., Kendall & Lord, supra note 3.
22. See infra notes 102–112 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Table 5 and surrounding text.

582

583

The Realities of Takings Litigation

takings fall into small, discrete categories and are “easily
identified.”24 The Court also has spent much of its intellectual effort
policing the boundaries between one of those discrete categories—
specifically, Lucas claims—and the realm of Penn Central.25 This
focus fits with a conventional understanding that the most
recurrent and important issues arise from alleged regulatory
takings. But in fact, non-Penn Central cases aren’t just more
abundant than one might expect; they also are more variegated
and—sometimes—doctrinally complex. Many cases raise questions
about the appropriate method of takings analysis, and the debate is
between physical and regulatory frameworks, not between Lucas
and Penn Central.26 In other cases, the key questions are about what
counts as constitutional property.27 Other cases are more rote;
courts dispose of many cases on statute-of-limitations grounds or
because they obviously fail to state a claim,28 and still other cases
are so esoteric that one would be hard-pressed to connect them to
any sort of larger theme.29 But to the extent that patterns do emerge,
one is that much of the work done by takings lawyers is oriented
toward avoiding the questions that fascinate academics and
Supreme Court justices. The goal, instead, appears to be to find
ways to fit cases within categorical boxes, where questions of justice
and fairness are off to the side and matters can be efficiently
resolved. These efforts often succeed, and the result is a
jurisprudence of category games, with haphazard alignments
between results and any broader sense of fairness or justice.

24. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 (2002).
25. See, e.g., id. at 325–32; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630–32 (2001).
26. See, e.g., Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1288–96 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (considering whether a requirement to send water through a fish ladder should be
analyzed as a physical or regulatory taking).
27. See, e.g., Bair v. United States, 515 F.3d 1323, 1327–30 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (evaluating
whether a plaintiff could have a property interest in the priority of a lien); Air Pegasus of
D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1217–18 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (considering whether a
heliport operator could have property rights in the use of navigable airspace overlying its
land); Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n. v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (considering whether peanut quotas are constitutionally-protected property);
Snyder & Assocs. Acquisitions LLC v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 120, 125–26 (2017)
(considering whether a business could have a property interest in an electronic filing
identification number issued by the IRS).
28. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
29. See infra Section IV.D.
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While the primary goal of this Article is to offer a descriptive
account of takings litigation, I also explore why the issues actually
being litigated differ from the issues addressed in academic and
Supreme Court discourse, and what the normative implications of
the discrepancies might be. The most likely—and somewhat
banal—reason for the difference is that while courts and
commentators tend to focus on the policy debates, most businesses
and law firms are more worried about making money. They have
decided that classic regulatory takings litigation offers a poor
business model and that sophisticated businesses have better ways
to sort out their differences with the administrative state. That has
left the field to law firms seeking to carve out subfields in which
they can build successful business models on categorical takings
standards and on aggregated, repeatable claims; to businesses and
attorneys seeking big payoffs through creative one-offs; and to the
fumbling rantings of an antigovernmental fringe. That may
ultimately seem reassuring; one implication is that existing
regulatory takings standards are deterring claims, which many
people may view as a welcome outcome. But amid all the focus on
regulatory takings,30 thorny questions about the boundaries of
physical takings analyses and even the nature of property are
escaping attention.31 And the continuing requests for the courts to
indulge “[t]he temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in
either direction”32 risk divorcing takings litigation from important
equity questions that should be at its core.
This Article’s analysis proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes
takings doctrine and explains traditional theories and areas of
debate. Part II explains my research methodology. Part III
summarizes quantitative results and explains ways in which my
findings differ from conventional wisdom about takings, as well as
some ways in which they corroborate that conventional wisdom.
30. Recent years seem to have produced an uptick in the Court’s interest in physical
takings cases. See infra Appendix I.
31. For exceptions that do focus on physical takings, see generally John D. Echeverria,
What is a Physical Taking?, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 731 (2020); Lynn E. Blais, The Total Takings
Myth, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 47 (2017); Sandra B. Zellmer, Takings, Torts, and Background
Principles, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 193 (2017); Lynda L. Butler, The Governance Function of
Constitutional Property, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1687 (2015); Andrea L. Peterson, The False
Dichotomy Between Physical and Regulatory Takings Analysis: A Critique of Tahoe-Sierra’s
Distinction Between Physical and Regulatory Takings, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 381 (2007).
32. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Part IV uses qualitative discussion of several key areas of
federal-court takings litigation to explore recurring themes and
issues, including questions about appropriate takings tests and the
boundaries of constitutional property. Finally, Part V switches from
describing results to explaining and evaluating them. It sets forth
several explanations for the differences between takings as viewed
from the Supreme Court and academia and takings litigation
on the ground. It also discusses normative implications of
those discrepancies.
I. TAKINGS LITIGATION: A TRADITIONAL VIEW
To place this Article’s findings in context, some background on
traditional takings doctrine and debates will be helpful. This
section therefore reviews currently settled doctrine and then
discusses areas of ongoing judicial and academic debate.
A. The Basics of Modern Takings Doctrine
Most accounts of contemporary takings doctrine begin with the
Supreme Court’s 1922 decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.33
Courts had been deciding takings cases since the dawn of the
republic, but those cases generally involved government actions
that confiscated or invaded land.34 Pennsylvania Coal was different.
The government’s action regulated the use of property rather than
physically invading it or asserting ownership claims over it.35 While
the Supreme Court had seen similar claims before, it had
previously rejected them.36 But in Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes
wrote that a regulation that goes “too far” is a taking.37 From that

33. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
34. See Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 360 (2015) (“Pennsylvania Coal
expanded the protection of the Takings Clause, holding that compensation was also required
for a ‘regulatory taking . . . .’”); e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 178 (1872)
(holding that permanent flooding caused a taking).
35. 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The property so restricted remains in the
possession of its owner. The State does not appropriate it or make any use of it.”).
36. E.g., Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908). While
commentators and court opinions tend to treat Pennsylvania Coal as a major departure from
preexisting law, its reasoning echoes that of McCarter—except that in McCarter, the plaintiffs
lost. See id. at 355–56 (stating that if police power regulations cut property down too far, a
taking would occur).
37. 260 U.S. at 415.
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cryptic phrase, the modern jurisprudence of regulatory takings
has emerged.
In the years since, the Supreme Court and lower courts have
refined takings doctrine in several ways. First, they agree that
governmental confiscations of property generally are takings,38
albeit with some exceptions, like seizures associated with criminal
proceedings.39 Likewise, direct and permanent governmental
invasions of private property are generally takings, though again with
some exceptions.40
Regulations also can create takings in several different ways.
Some regulations cause physical takings. If the effect of a regulation
is to confiscate property and thus substitute government
ownership for private ownership of that property, it is an
appropriation, which the Court has generally described as a per se
taking (and has often described as a physical taking).41 Similarly, if
a regulation compels property owners to suffer permanent, nongovernmental invasions of their property, that regulation again
effects a physical taking.42
Regulations also can create what we traditionally refer to as
regulatory takings,43 in which government neither compels the
property owner to suffer a physical invasion nor appropriates
ownership of property, but the regulatory restriction still effectively

38. E.g., Horne, 576 U.S. at 362 (holding that a governmental seizure of raisins was a
physical taking).
39. See, e.g., AmeriSource Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1149, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
40. See Echeverria, supra note 31, at 763–775 (describing exceptions).
41. E.g., Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) (“The
state statute has the practical effect of appropriating for the county the value of the use of the
fund for the period in which it is held in the registry.”); see also Echeverria, supra note 31, at
746–47 (noting the “cacophony” of ways in which the Court has described physical takings).
42. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 187 (1979) (holding that a
regulatory decision compelling landowners to allow public access to a previously private
lagoon would create a taking); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 426 (1982) (finding a taking where a local regulation compelled landowners to allow the
installation of cable boxes).
43. Because of the terminological oddity of using the phrase “physical takings” to
describe some takings caused by regulations and “regulatory taking” to describe other
takings caused by regulations, Krier and Sterk have suggested just using the phrase “implicit
takings.” Krier & Sterk, supra note 12, at 40–41 (quoting Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory
Remedies for Takings, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1637 (2015)). It is a sensible suggestion, but the
traditional approach is ingrained, and I have stuck with it.
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divests the owner of possession.44 The Court has developed two
main tests for deciding when such a regulatory taking has occurred.
If a regulation deprives a property of all economic value, and that
deprivation would not be authorized under background principles
of property law, then a categorical, or Lucas, taking has occurred.45
If, however, the governmental action leaves some economic value
in the property, then the court applies the classic three-part inquiry
set forth in Penn Central.46 It considers the extent of the diminution
in value, the nature of the government action, and the degree of
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.47
Importantly, both the Penn Central and Lucas tests require using the
value of the whole parcel as a denominator, rather than just using
the portion of the property—physical or temporal—that was
specifically burdened by the regulation.48 Physical takings, in
contrast, can occur even when the allegedly taken portion of the
property is just a small percentage of a larger parcel.49
One last category of takings jurisprudence straddles physical
and regulatory takings boundaries. In a series of three cases—
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,50 Dolan v. City of Tigard,51 and
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Authority52—the
Supreme Court has held that exactions can be takings. An exaction
occurs when a regulator grants a property owner permission to do
something with her property, but only on the condition that the
owner provides some benefit in return. That benefit might be to
allow physical access to the property, as happened in the disputes
that generated Nollan and Dolan, or it might be to provide some
other form of compensation, monetary or otherwise, for the impacts
44. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702,
713 (2010) (“Similarly, our doctrine of regulatory takings ‘aims to identify regulatory actions
that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking.’”) (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005)).
45. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
46. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (summarizing the Penn
Central framework).
47. Id.
48. Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Auth., 535 U.S. 302, 326–27 (2002).
49. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434–35
(1982) (noting that the Court has found physical invasions to be takings even when the
invasion “has only minimal economic impact on the owner”).
50. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825.
51. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374–75.
52. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 595–97 (2013).
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of the permitted property use.53 Exactions are routine components
of government-permitting programs, and they usually occur
without constitutional suspicion.54 But if the exacted benefit lacks a
“nexus” to the impact regulators are ostensibly trying to abate, or
if the extent of the exaction isn’t roughly proportional to the extent
of the impact, then, according to the Court, a taking has occurred.55
The tests described so far all presume an initial conclusion that
the allegedly taken interest qualifies as property. In most Supreme
Court takings cases, the need to test that presumption does not
come up.56 The Court often deals with challenges brought by
landowners, and there is no question that the plaintiffs owned the
land in question.57 But in the Federal Circuit and Court of Federal
Claims, which deal with many non-land property interests,
questions about what qualifies as property often arise.58 The
Federal Circuit therefore folds the Supreme Court’s takings tests
into a larger analytical framework.59 The first step, under this
framework, is to determine whether the plaintiff actually holds a
property interest in the allegedly taken thing.60 If the answer is yes,
then, at step two, the court must decide whether that interest was
taken, using whichever Supreme Court takings test is appropriate
to the case at hand.61
B. The Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit
Because institutional arrangements and judicial ideologies
sometimes matter as much as doctrine, this background summary
53. See, e.g., id. at 601–02 (describing compensatory mitigation requested by state
wetlands regulators).
54. See Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 623–24 (describing the importance of exactions).
55. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (establishing the “rough proportionality” standard); Nollan,
483 U.S. at 837 (stating the necessity of an “essential nexus”).
56. See Maureen E. Brady, Property’s Ceiling: State Courts and the Expansion of Takings
Clause Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (2016) (“Paradoxically, the term ‘property’ has
received less attention than the rest of the words in these takings clauses . . . .”); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 951 (2000) (arguing that
the Supreme Court has been inattentive to questions about what counts as constitutionallyprotected property).
57. See infra Table 1.
58. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Baley v. United States, 942 F.3d 1312, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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also briefly discusses the courts that hear takings cases against the
federal government. If numbers of published decisions are a good
indication (and they might not be62), most takings cases are filed
against state or local defendants and in state court.63 Takings cases
against the federal government, however, that have a value
exceeding $10,000, may be brought only in the United States Court
of Federal Claims.64 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over the Court of Federal
Claims, and the United States Supreme Court in turn reviews
Federal Circuit decisions.65 Oddly, the Supreme Court has rarely
exercised that review. In the forty-two years since Penn Central was
decided, the Court has decided forty-four cases involving takings
claims. Only one of those cases—Arkansas Game & Fish Commission
v. United States66—was initially filed in the Court of Federal Claims.
The Court of Federal Claims’s ability to hear takings cases is
bounded in several key ways. First, the Tucker Act establishes a
six-year statute of limitations.67 Second, the Court of Federal Claims
can hear only monetary takings claims against the United States; in
a takings case, it cannot hear claims for declaratory or injunctive
relief, even if they arise out of the same underlying set of facts.68
Third, the Court of Federal Claims cannot hear a case if another
62. As described in Part III, some types of takings cases may be filed in abundance but
produce few published decisions, largely because they tend to settle.
63. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 12, at 78 (table showing many more cases against state
and local governments than against the federal government). Throughout most of my study
period, cases against state entities would have been brought primarily in state court. See id.
at 77–78 (providing numbers, but also noting that some litigants continued to file cases in
federal court even after they should have known not to). This happened because a
combination of United States Supreme Court decisions—Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) and San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San
Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005)—required plaintiffs to seek a final state-court disposition before
they could allege that state or local governments had taken their property, and then
precluded collateral federal-court attacks on the outcomes of those state court proceedings.
In Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), the Supreme Court overruled
Williamson County.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Claims worth under $10,000 may be brought either in the
Court of Federal Claims or in federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
66. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2501; see John R. Sand & Gravel v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–36
(2008) (holding that this statute of limitations is jurisdictional and can require dismissal even
if the United States does not raise the issue).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1491; Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. Cl.
1962) (“The claim must, of course, be for money.”).
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federal court case arising out of the same facts was pending when
the Court of Federal Claims action was filed, even if that other case
seeks different relief.69 In combination, these requirements create
challenges for a takings plaintiff who also wishes to bring non-takings
claims—for example, claims that a government action was arbitrary
and capricious or that it violated the First Amendment.70 The
plaintiff cannot bring those actions concurrently, and if the plaintiff
waits to bring the takings claim until after the other claim has been
disposed, the statute of limitations may have run.71
One other detail about the Court of Federal Claims bears
mentioning and has often been highlighted in accounts of takings
litigation. It is a conservative court. The court came into existence
in 1982, when Congress replaced the previously existing Court of
Patent Appeals and Court of Claims with a single entity called the
Court of Federal Claims. Judges previously serving on the Court of
Claims were converted into Court of Federal Claims judges, but
their terms were temporary.72 Consequently, within a few years,
every judge on the Court of Federal Claims had been appointed by
a Republican president.73 This was not happenstance. Conservative
activists at the time openly stated that they had grabbed an
opportunity to create an important court and stack it with
sympathetic judges.74 The Court of Federal Claims has become only
slightly more balanced in the years since. As of July 2021, nineteen
of the twenty-four judges who hear cases (including regular and
senior judges) are Republican appointees.75
C. Takings Questions and Debates
Everything in the foregoing summary of takings law is
currently settled doctrine. But there is, and for many years has been,
ample debate about how the many interstitial questions within
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1500; see United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307, 317
(2011) (“Two suits are for or in respect to the same claim, precluding jurisdiction in the CFC,
if they are based on substantially the same operative facts, regardless of the relief sought in
each suit.”).
70. See, e.g., Ministerio Roca Solida v. United States, 778 F.3d 1351, 1352–55 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
71. See id. at 1357–59 (Taranto, J., concurring) (describing these challenges for litigants).
72. Kendall & Lord, supra note 3, at 533.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 535.
75. See Judges – Biographies, U.S. CT. FED. CLAIMS, https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/
judicial-officers (last reviewed Nov. 9, 2021).
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these broad standards should be resolved. More generally, judges
and academics for years have debated what takings doctrine
should be, and nearly every principle I have summarized above is
controversial even if it may currently be black-letter law. The
debates are too voluminous for a complete explication, but the
following overview summarizes some of the key questions judges
and academics have discussed—each of which informs the
empirical analysis that follows.
1. The primacy and problems of Penn Central
In its 2002 decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency,76 the Supreme Court stated that “physical
appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified, and usually
represent a greater affront to individual property rights.”77 In
subsequent decisions, it has repeated similar statements, noting, for
example, that physical and Lucas takings occupy “relatively narrow
categories,”78 and asserting that most takings cases involve ad-hoc,
fact-specific applications of the Penn Central standard.79 Academics
have said similar things, describing Penn Central as “[t]he general
default standard that applies [in most] takings [cases],”80 and
asserting that “[w]ithout any question, the most important case
interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.”81 While a few scholars have
contested this view, most academics and judges seem to agree that
in takings litigation, the Penn Central framework governs most of
the action.
76. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
77. Id. at 324.
78. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005).
79. E.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 32 (2012) (“[A]side
from the cases attended by rules of this order, most takings claims turn on situation-specific
factual inquiries.”); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Cases attempting to decide when a regulation becomes a taking are among the most
litigated and perplexing in current law.”); see also Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct.
2063, 2082 (2021) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[M]ost government action affecting property rights
is analyzed case by case under Penn Central’s fact-intensive test.”).
80. Fenster, supra note 54, at 612; see id. at 618 (“Courts subject the majority of takings
claims . . . to a Penn Central inquiry . . . .”).
81. Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 913 (2016);
see ANDREW COAN, RATIONING THE CONSTITUTION: HOW JUDICIAL CAPACITY SHAPES
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 148 (2019) (asserting that “the highly deferential Penn
Central regime . . . has long applied to the vast majority of challenged regulations”).
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That framing is consistent with the Supreme Court’s grants of
review. Since 1978, when it decided Penn Central, the Court has
issued forty-two takings decisions. Twenty-seven are clearly
regulatory takings cases.82 Only nine have involved applying a
physical taking standard.83 The Court’s past decade does hint at a
shift in interest (as well as a possible decline in the Court’s overall
interest in takings); four of the seven cases decided since 2010
involve physical takings analytical frameworks (a fourth—the
Court’s first Horne decision—did not address what takings
framework was appropriate). But on the whole, over the past
several decades, the Court has been interested primarily in
regulatory takings. It also has repeatedly reaffirmed the importance
of the Penn Central framework,84 while only in two cases—Palazzolo
and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council—has the Court discussed the
Lucas standard, both times rejecting its applicability.85
In academic writing, the disparity of interest is even more
pronounced. Since the 1960s, regulatory takings jurisprudence has
been a central focus of scholarly interest, while writing about
physical takings has been comparatively rare.86 The resulting body
of scholarship is rich, with authors tackling questions like when
compensation for regulatory burdens will lead to economically
efficient decisions by regulators and private actors,87 how

82. See infra Appendix I. This category includes three land use regulation cases—Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255 (1980); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S.
340 (1986); and City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687 (1999)—which
the Court resolved without actually applying a regulatory takings standard, but which
would have produced regulatory takings decisions had it proceeded to the merits.
83. This number would rise to eleven if one includes Nollan and Dolan, both of which
I have placed in a separate category of exactions cases.
84. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942–43 (2017); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.,
544 U.S. 528, 538–39 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 321 (2002).
85. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 325–32; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 622 (2001).
86. For rare examples of recent physical takings scholarship, see infra Appendix I.
87. See generally, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and
the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000) (questioning claims that
takings doctrine forces government to think more carefully about the economic impacts of
regulation); Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic
Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569 (1984) (exploring efficiency arguments for and against
compensation for regulatory takings); Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry
Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. ECON. 71, 90–91 (1984)
(analyzing the efficiency of paying compensation for land taken through eminent domain).
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regulatory takings doctrine can (or cannot) be squared with the
Constitution’s text and original meaning,88 how regulatory takings
doctrine fits with public choice theories of political decisionmaking,89 and how to reconcile regulatory takings jurisprudence
with basic theories of property—among other topics.90 This Article
will not resolve any of these debates, though it should inform them,
and for present purposes, the key point is that academic inquiry has
gravitated to the intellectual challenges of regulatory takings.
Closely related to—and perhaps explaining—the emphasis on
Penn Central is another theme: takings doctrine, many

88. See generally, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Regulatory
Takings: Why the Fifth Amendment May Not Protect Against Regulatory Takings, but the
Fourteenth Amendment May, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (2008) (arguing that the Takings Clause
may have a dual original meaning); Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property
Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549 (2003) (examining insights from nineteenth-century cases
into the original meaning of the Takings Clause); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early
Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000)
(comparing the history of land use law in founding era with modern expansive readings of
the Takings Clause); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996) (arguing that colonial land use regulation would have
been inconsistent with more expansive modern interpretations of the Takings Clause);
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995) (arguing that political-process-based historical
understandings of the Takings Clause argue against granting compensation for regulatory
restrictions on the use of property); William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original
Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985)
(arguing that the emergence of constitutional takings restrictions reflected a shift from
republican to liberal political ideologies).
89. See generally, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST.
COMMENT. 279 (1992) (examining economic analyses of takings, including how public choice
theory may factor into the analysis); Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA.
L. REV. 1333 (1991) (arguing that takings law protects the least secure parties in political processes).
90. See generally, e.g., ERIC FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON
GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND (2007) (arguing that property derives from community
and should be subject to community regulation); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Property-as-Society,
2018 WIS. L. REV. 911 (2018) (describing three classic theories of property and their
implications for takings doctrine); Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253
(2013) (applying multiple property theories to groundwater regulation); Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967) (using utilitarian property theory to develop takings doctrine); see
generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY
THEORY (2012) (discussing different property theories and their implications, including
implications for regulatory takings).
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commentators agree, is a mess.91 For many scholars, the origins of
that messiness lie in the indeterminacy of the Penn Central
framework.92 Penn Central provides three broad factors for courts
to consider without specifying rules for applying any of those
factors, or for establishing their relative weights. 93 The
consequence, many commentators allege, is an unpredictable
totality-of-the-circumstances test.94 Other scholars have argued that
Penn Central’s indeterminacy is more symptom than cause, and that
the real root of the confusion is conflicting notions about the ends
takings doctrine—and property law more generally—should
serve.95 But even as commentators ascribe the confusion to different
causes, it has long been commonplace to describe regulatory
takings doctrine as a muddle.
One might expect the Supreme Court to have risen to the
defense of its much-maligned takings jurisprudence, but it has not
really done so. Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly
reaffirmed the Penn Central framework, it has never offered
particularly vigorous defenses of that standard.96 Nor has it tried to
articulate a foundational theory that lends broader coherence to its
takings jurisprudence. Instead, on multiple occasions, the Court has
remarked on its own struggles to arrive at predictable and just
standards for resolving takings cases.97 Its decisions convey the
impression that Penn Central’s affirmers have adhered to the
standard not because they particularly like it, but because they have
not been able to come up with something better.
91. E.g., Byrne, supra note 3, at 102 (“The regulatory takings doctrine has generated a
plethora of inconsistent and open-ended formulations that have failed to make sense of the
underlying constitutional impulse.”).
92. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 7, at 7 (asserting that the Court’s “decisions since
Penn Central have sown nothing but confusion.”).
93. Penn Cent. Transp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
94. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENV’T L &
POL’Y 171, 175 (2005) (stating that the test has served as “legal decoration for judicial rulings
based on intuition”).
95. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 9, at 593 (describing tensions between wealth-acquisition
and civic-virtue-based conceptions of property law); Sax, supra note 9, at 37–38 (describing
tensions that long predate Penn Central).
96. Perhaps the strongest judicial defense comes from Murr. Justice Kennedy’s
opinion for the Court noted that takings standards—particularly Penn Central—give courts
“flexibility” to balance important and competing policy concerns. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137
S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017).
97. See Byrne, supra note 3, at 102–03 (quoting some of the less-than-stirring ways in
which the Court has described its own standards).
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The handwringing, or worse, over the Penn Central standard
stands in contrast to the Court’s and scholars’ discussions of nonPenn Central takings. In those realms, the Court has rarely critiqued
its own doctrine, and its passing statements often suggest that the
law of physical takings “involves the straightforward application
of per se rules.”98 There are hints of a different view. In Arkansas
Game & Fish Commission v. United States, for example, a unanimous
Court rejected using categorical rules to govern cases arising from
temporary flooding, and it instead adopted a multi-part standard
resembling the Penn Central test.99 Implicit in that choice of a
multi-part standard is an acknowledgment that physical takings
might not be as simple as the Court usually suggests. Similarly,
some academic writing has argued that the realm of physical
takings involves underappreciated complexities.100 And some older
work suggests that basic questions about what constitutes
property—an issue that cuts across all types of takings claims—
deserve more attention than they traditionally receive.101 But for the
most part, both Supreme Court decisions and academic analyses
convey the impression that takings is a muddle because regulatory
takings doctrine is a muddle. For other takings, one would think,
the courts have their house in order, litigants know what to expect,
and the cases do not come up often enough to matter all that much.
2. The political stories and stakes
A second recurring theme of takings jurisprudence and
scholarship is that takings doctrine is centrally important to the
relationships between property owners and the state. Ordering
these relationships is one of the most contentious political issues of
our time, and scholars, judges, and policymakers disagree
profoundly about the degree to which regulation should constrain
individual uses of property. But whatever their views about the
appropriate degree of regulation, commentators appear to agree
that takings doctrine will play an important role in resolving
the disputes.
98. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 233 (2003) (quoting Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321–323 (2002).); see TahoeSierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 324 (describing physical takings as “easily identified”).
99. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 38–40 (2012).
100. See supra note 31 (citing articles that explore this complexity).
101. See Merrill, supra note 31.
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On the conservative side, the view that takings doctrine should
be centrally important received its most famous and influential
exposition in Richard Epstein’s book Takings.102 Drawing together
arguments grounded in constitutional originalism, economics, and
political theory, Epstein argued that essentially any government
action that goes beyond traditional common-law tort and property
doctrines and limits uses of private property or redistributes
wealth—including taxation—is a taking.103 He coupled those
assertions with a call to action, arguing that judges should boldly
employ the takings clause to limit all kinds of regulations.104
For the most part, legal scholars dismissed Epstein’s work (one
reviewer described it as “a travesty of constitutional scholarship”).105
But in political and judicial realms, Epstein’s ideas caught fire.106 In
an often-quoted passage, Charles Fried, who was Solicitor General
in the Reagan Administration, explained,
Attorney General Meese and his young advisors—many drawn
from the ranks of the then fledgling Federalist Societies and often
devotees of the extreme libertarian views of Chicago law
professor Richard Epstein—had a specific, aggressive, and, it
seemed to be, quite radical project in mind: to use the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a severe brake upon federal
and state regulation of business and property. The grand plan was
to make government pay . . . for a taking . . . every time its
regulations impinged too severely on a property right . . . . If the
government labored under so severe an obligation, there would
be, to say the least, much less regulation. 107

In subsequent years, this effort broadened to become something
its opponents labeled “the takings project.”108 Supported by
conservative foundation money, non-profit law firms like the
Pacific Legal Foundation sought out promising cases to litigate and
appeal, often bringing their claims all the way to the Supreme

102. EPSTEIN, supra note 88.
103. Id.
104. See Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error, 4 CATO J.
711, 715–18 (1985).
105. Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 24 (1986).
106. See Kendall & Lord, supra note 3, at 528–30.
107. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 183 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
108. Kendall & Lord, supra note 3.
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Court.109 They often found sympathetic audiences in judges
appointed partly because of their anti-regulatory bona fides.110 The
results, during the 1980s and 1990s, were a series of Supreme Court
and federal appellate victories for takings litigants111 and a broader
sense that a coordinated movement was underway, and that its
ambitious goal was to use takings litigation to take down the
regulatory state.112
As one might expect, that project has many critics.113 At a
conceptual level, critics argue that takings activism rests on a
theoretically flawed conception of property. To libertarian-leaning
takings activists, property rights are, fundamentally, entitlements
to exploit land or other resources without governmental
restraint, and these broad entitlements exist because property is a
natural and pre-political right.114 To many other property theorists,
however, those claims are nonsense. Property, they argue, exists
and holds value because it is created and protected by a political
community,115 and therefore that community should have the
ability to use democratic processes to adjust the terms under which
property is held and used.116 Critics also point out that the
libertarian ideals underpinning property rights activism overlook
the interconnectedness of property.117 The regulations that
spawn takings cases, they argue, often arise because uses of
109. Id. at 511, 541–45; see Oliver A. Houck, More Unfinished Stories: Lucas, Atlanta
Coalition, and Palila/Sweet Home, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 344–47 (2004).
110. See Kendall & Lord, supra note 3, at 533–38.
111. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of
L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (opening temporary regulatory restrictions up to takings claims);
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (upholding a finding
that denial of a wetlands permit caused a taking).
112. See Kendall & Lord, supra note 3, at 542 (“As PLF founder and past-President
Ronald Zumbrun boasted, ‘[w]e see the ‘90s as our decade. . . . We have the weapons. . . .’”).
113. In addition to the critiques described below, critics argue that the takings project
reflects poor historical and constitutional interpretation. See supra note 88 and accompanying
text (compiling sources).
114. See Mulvaney, supra note 90, at 914–15; Joseph William Singer, The Ownership
Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENV’T. L.
REV. 309, 312 (2006) (describing these views).
115. E.g., Rose, supra note 9, at 595 (“The concept of a prepolitical property right is
problematic, primarily because it fails to address the question of what it means to ‘own’
anything in the absence of the community’s protection.”).
116. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENV’T. L. REV. 75, 114–16 (2010).
117. See id. at 79–84.
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regulated property were harming private or public interests in
other property, leaving the government no choice but to serve
as referee.118
Adding to these theoretical critiques is a distributional concern:
that takings litigation empowers relatively wealthy interests at the
expense of everyone else. By definition, successful takings plaintiffs
must have property, and they must have enough of it that bringing
litigation for lost value is worthwhile. That means, according to
critics, that takings litigation is primarily about empowering the
wealthy.119 For basic equity reasons, that seems problematic. It also
creates challenges for some of the theories underlying takings
doctrine. One ostensible goal of takings is to protect individuals
who have been unfairly singled out by political processes.120 But
affluent property owners, as multiple commentators have pointed
out, seem unlikely to be the sort of repeat losers about which
political process theories tend to be concerned.121 Instead, they
seem to do quite well in politics, which arguably makes takings
victories more likely to be gratuitous handouts than compensation
for political victimization.122
Of course, the proponents of takings litigation have responses
to these critiques. In their view, takings litigation does indeed pit
the disempowered against the establishment, but the roles are
reversed. The Goliath, in their account, is government regulation—
the “green machine,” in David Lucas’s memorable phrase—and the
plaintiffs are individuals gamely standing against the colossus.123
In these accounts, then, takings litigation serves several key
118. E.g., Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 153
(1971) (noting how many takings cases involving competing property claims).
119. See, e.g., Houck, supra note 109, at 334–36 (describing David Lucas as a successful
and politically-connected developer); id. at 348 (describing the powerful interests that
actively supported Lucas’s case).
120. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22–24 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the takings clause prevents governments from achieving their regulatory goals
“off budget” and at the expense of particular individuals).
121. See Byrne, supra note 3, at 129 (“Invoking [political process arguments] to defend
the regulatory takings doctrine would, however, be ludicrous.”); Kendall & Lord, supra note
3, at 584 (raising similar concerns).
122. See Byrne, supra note 3, at 129 (“Real property ownership in the United States is
very widely dispersed, and property owners have the means to be—and are—very politically
active in defense of their interests.”).
123. DAVID LUCAS, LUCAS VS. THE GREEN MACHINE (Lorna Bolkey, Josh Warren & Pat
Hutchison Roberts, eds., 1st ed., 1995).
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functions. It provides some compensation to individual plaintiffs
who have been unfairly “singled out” by warped political
processes.124 And it also provides important financial incentives for
government, which otherwise would exercise its regulatory power
with overweening indifference, to take the costs of regulatory
oversight into account.125
Obviously, the disagreements among these positions are
significant. Yet all share a common conviction that takings
litigation is the courtroom locus for important debates about the
appropriate scope and reach of regulatory governance. That seems
like a plausible position; if regulatory takings doctrine is the
predominant form of takings litigation, and the core question in
regulatory takings litigation is when government has gone “too
far,”126 then one would expect takings cases to be at the center of
disputes over regulation. Consequently, whether participants in
takings disputes argue in favor of or against that role, they tend to
assume that a central role presently exists.
II. METHODOLOGY
To test this conventional wisdom, I created a data set of takings
cases filed in the Court of Claims between January 1, 2000, and
December 31, 2014. I chose the Court of Claims because
Bloomberg’s database of dockets (which draws on the federal
courts’ PACER system) is nearly comprehensive for that period,
and because my research assistant and I were unable to identify any
similarly comprehensive and searchable database of state court
complaints. I chose the 2000–14 period because I expected the
availability of pre-2000 electronic documents to be inconsistent
and because cases filed more recently than 2014 are likely to
be unresolved.
I compiled the data set by searching for (a) dockets for cases that
Bloomberg classified as inverse condemnation, and (b) dockets that

124. See Pennell, 485 U.S. at 22–24 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. U.S.,
28 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that a regulatory takings case “requires us to
decide which collective rights are to be obtained at collective cost, in order better to preserve
collectively the rights of the individual”).
125. See Pennell, 485 U.S. at 22–24 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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came up through keyword searches.127 For each of those cases, I
reviewed—to the extent they were available through Bloomberg
or Westlaw—complaints and substantive court orders. I also
reviewed briefs, status reports, and other documents, to the extent
that reviewing them helped me determine the nature and
disposition of the case. I also reviewed settlements, which I
obtained through Bloomberg’s databases and through FOIA
requests to the Department of Justice. The resulting data set
probably does not include every takings case filed in the Court of
Federal Claims during this period,128 but it should come close, and
I am not aware of any way in which the omissions would bias the
resulting sample.
For each case, a research assistant and I recorded the plaintiffs
and coded for plaintiff type, dividing the plaintiffs into (a)
individuals and married couples, (b) government entities, (c) nonprofit entities, (d) privately held businesses, and (e) publicly traded
companies. I also counted the total number of plaintiffs involved in
each case. Additionally, we coded whether companies were on
Forbes’ Fortune 500 or Fortune 1000 lists at the time cases were
filed. We also recorded the law firm (or solo practice) representing
the plaintiffs and coded whether that firm had a Chambers
Ranking129 and, if so, whether it was ranked nationally or just
regionally.130 The goal of these classifications was to determine who
tends to bring takings claims and, more precisely, whether the
clients and lawyers are part of what one might consider a business
and legal establishment.131
127. This search produced over 800 dockets. Some cases produced multiple dockets,
which explains why the total number of cases in my sample is significantly less than the total
number of dockets.
128. Cases likely to fall through the cracks would have two features: they would not be
classified by Bloomberg as takings cases (which sometimes occurs when takings and breach–
of–contract claims appear in the same case), and their dockets would not be text-searchable
(which is more common with cases filed early in my study period).
129. See Find the Top Lawyers and Law Firms in the Chambers USA Guide, CHAMBERS AND
PARTNERS, https://chambers.com/guide/usa?publicationTypeId=5 (last visited Oct. 14,
2021) (describing the rankings, which the Chambers bills as a guide to America’s leading
lawyers for business). Because firm status could change over the period during which cases
filed between 2000 and 2014 were litigated, I used rankings from 2003–04, 2009, and 2015.
130. For this purpose, I defined a national ranking as either receiving a nationwide
ranking or being ranked in at least three different geographic markets.
131. These are not terms of art, of course. Here, I am just using “establishment” to refer
to particularly powerful and wealthy institutions.
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I also recorded several data points about the nature of the
takings claim, including the general category of claim being
brought, the government agency (if there was one) whose actions
precipitated the takings claim, and whether the claim generated a
Penn Central or Lucas analysis. I initially began recording whether
the claim was for a physical or regulatory taking, but plaintiffs often
did not specify, and for some claims, the classification a court might
use was unclear, contested, or both. Most claims, however, fell into
categories that clearly qualify as physical takings, even if the
plaintiffs never specified that classification in their filings.
I also recorded the dispositions of cases. Specifically, I recorded
which party or parties prevailed, the basis on which they prevailed,
and, if at least some of the plaintiffs prevailed, the amount of just
compensation and attorneys’ fees (both normalized to 2020 dollars)
they and their lawyers received.
Finally, I combined this analysis with more traditional and
qualitative legal research, which meant reviewing decisions and
other documents132 to identify recurring issues and to understand
and critique the courts’ reasoning.
This methodology creates several important limitations. First,
readers should be aware that I could not obtain about ten percent
of the settlements, generally because they had not been filed in
court and the Department of Justice was unable to find the files. I
also was not able to obtain any documentation for a few cases,
which typically were pro se cases filed early in the study period.
Even within the pool of cases for which I was able to obtain
documentation, the numbers are likely to have some minor errors,
which derive from challenges like the difficulty of extrapolating
total numbers of plaintiffs from a series of different complaints,
none of which provides on its own a complete record of the number
of participants in a case. Finally, some cases filed before 2014 have
not reached a final resolution. Consequently, readers should view
the numbers in the section that follows as strong approximations,
not as exact and error-free totals.
A second limitation, which I have already mentioned, is that a
study of takings claims against the federal government sheds
limited light on the nature of takings litigation against state and

132. The other documents category includes complaints, briefs, status reports, and
other filings that helped me determine what issues cases raised and how they were resolved.
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local governments. The two areas of litigation aren’t entirely
disconnected; the Court of Federal Claims ostensibly applies the
same body of constitutional law that state and local governments
apply,133 and federal government activity overlaps with many areas
of state and local activity.134 That is even true of land use regulation,
which the Supreme Court has described as a “quintessential” state
and local government function.135 The federal government also
engages in a huge amount of land use management and regulation,
partly through its ownership and management of vast swaths of
land,136 partly as a builder or sponsor of infrastructure,137 and partly
through environmental regulatory programs.138 So while one
might expect federal, state, and local takings cases to emphasize
different areas of government activity, there also should be
substantial overlap. Nevertheless, I do not argue that my
conclusions about federal-court litigation should be assumed to
generalize to state courts.
Third, a study of takings cases cannot identify impacts that
occur outside the courtroom. For example, my data do not reveal
how many cases were never filed because potential plaintiffs
thought governing legal standards were too unfavorable. Neither
do they reveal government actions that never were taken or were
modified because of the deterrent effect of potential takings claims.
Nor do they reveal ways in which takings cases may have
influenced political discourse, perhaps by affecting understandings
133. But see Krier & Sterk, supra note 12, at 56 (“[C]ourts do not know or understand
Supreme Court doctrine, or willfully ignore it or interpret it as having significant play in
the joints.”).
134. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695, 1698 (2017) (arguing
the federalism theories premised on separate state and federal roles are largely obsolete).
135. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982).
136. See generally John D. Leshy, Public Land Policy After the Trump Administration: Is This
a Turning Point?, 31 COLO. NAT’L RES., ENERGY & ENV’T L. REV. 471 (2020) (describing the
amount of publicly owned land and the agencies that manage it).
137. See generally HUNTER BLAIR, ECON. POL’Y INST., WHAT IS THE IDEAL MIX OF
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE? (2017)
(describing federal involvement in infrastructure development).
138. See, e.g., Dave Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58, 81–82
(2016) (describing Clean Water Act section 404 permitting); Patricia E. Salkin, The Quiet
Revolution and Federalism: Into the Future, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 277–96 (2012)
(providing an overview of federal regulatory programs that affect land use); J.B. Ruhl, How
to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species Act “HCP” Permits
for Real Estate Development, 5 ENV’T. LAW. 345 (1999) (describing Endangered Species
Act permitting).
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of what property is and what it means to exercise ownership. A
database from cases can be revealing, in other words, but it falls
short of illuminating everything that might be interesting or
important about takings doctrine.
III. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
This Part summarizes the quantitative results of my inquiry. As
it explains in detail, there are some ways in which takings litigation
before the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit
corresponds with conventional wisdom, but there are other ways
in which it is different—sometimes dramatically so.
A. Numbers and Types of Cases and Plaintiffs
Both academic and Supreme Court writing suggest that takings
jurisprudence should be dominated by regulatory takings claims.139
That expectation seems consistent with some of the classic
narratives of takings litigation, which emphasize the role of takings
in checking the regulatory state, and with judicial rhetoric
describing the federal government’s regulatory apparatus as a
growing and far-reaching behemoth.140 But numbers of takings
cases and plaintiffs tell a different story.141
Before the Court of Federal Claims, physical takings cases are
much more abundant than regulatory takings cases. The most
abundant category of takings cases, by far, involves rails-to-trails
conversions, which Part IV discusses in more detail. Without
exception, these are physical takings cases. Similarly, the third-,

139. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010)
(describing “[t]he growth of the Executive Branch, which now wields vast power and
touches almost every aspect of daily life”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149
(10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (warning of deference doctrines that allegedly allow
“executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power
and concentrate federal power”).
141. Before delving into the numbers, one clarification about my counting
methodologies may be helpful. While I searched for cases by docket numbers and initially
did a docket-by-docket review of cases, the numbers that appear below are not based on
numbers of case dockets. Instead, the number of cases treats a set of consolidated cases
against a government action as a single case, and the number of plaintiffs counts each distinct
plaintiff separately (treating family units as single plaintiffs). I did this because the numbers
most likely to be of interest are (a) how many cases were litigated, and (b) how many
plaintiffs were involved, and docket numbers correspond poorly to both of those metrics.
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sixth-, and seventh-most numerous categories of cases also involve
physical takings claims, and the fourth-most abundant category—
water rights cases—often involves plaintiffs trying to characterize
regulatory restrictions as physical takings.
TABLE 1: CASE NUMBERS BY CATEGORY
Category of Case

Number of Cases

Rails-to-trails conversions

108

Mining regulation

44

Flooding allegedly caused by government infrastructure

35

Water rights

19

General public lands

19

Military overflights

14

Regulatory permitting

14

Erosion or avulsion allegedly caused by government action

13

Intellectual property
Government management
companies

12
of

financially

distressed
11

Military operations (non-overflight)

11

Contaminated site cleanup

10

Seizure or civil forfeiture associated with prosecutorial action

10

Agricultural price program regulation

7

Extinguishment of claims against foreign sovereigns

7

Air traffic regulation

7

Contract breach

7

Tribal resources

6

Forest fire damage

6

Unauthorized maintenance of air traffic control towers

5

Food safety regulation

4

Other

69

Unclear

27

The disparity becomes even more striking when one considers
the number of plaintiffs bringing cases rather than the number of
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cases litigated. As Figure 1 shows, for my pool of cases, almost
ninety percent of the plaintiffs fall into three categories: rails-totrails conversions, military overflights, and flooding. The rails-totrails cases alone account for more than half of the plaintiffs. All of
these plaintiffs are filing physical takings claims. Some of the
remaining categories, like mining regulation, generally involve
regulatory takings claims, and in others, like the water rights cases
and the cases arising from post-2008 governmental management of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the method of takings analysis is
contested.142 But in the aggregate, the number of regulatory takings
plaintiffs is relatively small.
FIGURE 1: PLAINTIFFS BY CASE CATEGORY
rails to trails
military overflights
flooding
all others
management of financially
distressed companies
mining

agricultural price programs
water rights
claims against foreign
sovereigns

Total n = 11,693
Another measure captures the rarity of classic regulatory
takings analyses. Of over 400 cases in the overall pool, I found just
142. See infra Part IV.
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twenty-three in which a court actually applied a Lucas or Penn
Central standard, or in which those standards obviously would
have factored into a settlement. Those cases collectively involve 366
plaintiffs, but 299 of those plaintiffs are involved in just two cases,
both brought by car dealerships arguing (unsuccessfully) that the
federal government took their property when, during the Great
Recession, it induced auto companies to terminate some of their
franchise arrangements.143 In addition to these cases, there are
many others that might have turned on a Penn Central analysis
if they had reached the merits, but instead were voluntarily
dismissed (often for unclear reasons) or dismissed as time-barred,
because of 28 U.S.C. section 1500, or on some other pre-merits
basis.144 There are also some cases in which incomplete records or
incoherent complaints make it difficult to assess whether the
plaintiffs anticipated application of regulatory takings standards.145
But even accounting for those cases, classic regulatory takings cases
are rare, and regulatory takings analyses are rarer still.
The data set also allows approximate quantification of the
merits questions that are being litigated instead of Penn Central and
Lucas questions. Most notably, an issue that comes up more often
than either Penn Central or Lucas is whether the plaintiff actually
holds a property interest in the thing allegedly taken by the
government.146 Within my overall pool of cases, forty-nine were
dismissed for this reason, and an uncertain but non-trivial number
143. See A & D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(rejecting a motion to dismiss the car dealership cases but holding that the plaintiffs would
need to demonstrate a loss of economic value); Colonial Chevrolet Co. v. United States, 145
Fed. Cl. 243, 249 (2019) (holding that the United States did not compel Chrysler to reject the
franchise agreements and that those agreements would have had no value but for the United
States’ intervention).
144. Specifically: forty-nine cases were voluntarily dismissed; thirty-nine were
dismissed because the statute of limitations had run; twelve were dismissed because of 28
U.S.C. section 1500; and nine were dismissed on ripeness grounds. For a few of these cases,
the Court of Federal Claims offered multiple reasons for the dismissal.
145. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Bair v. United States, 515 F.3d 1323, 1327–30 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (evaluating
whether a plaintiff could have a property interest in the priority of a lien); Air Pegasus of
D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1217–18 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (considering whether
helicopter operator could have property rights in the use of navigable airspace); Members of
Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n v. United States, 421 F.3d. 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (considering
whether peanut quotas are constitutionally protected property); Snyder & Assocs. Acquisitions
LLC v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 120, 125–26 (2017) (considering whether a business could
have a property interest in an electronic filing identification number issued by the IRS).
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of successful plaintiffs needed to navigate this issue before
obtaining a favorable court judgment or settlement.147
B. Who Gets Paid
In addition to tracking which categories of cases and plaintiffs
are most abundant, the data also reveal which kinds of cases and
plaintiffs tend to succeed and what sort of payouts different types
of claims produce.
Table 3, below, summarizes the success rates for cases and for
individual plaintiffs. Several main findings emerge from these data.
First (and consistent with prior findings and conventional wisdom),
physical takings claims produce particularly high success rates. For
some categories, those rates may just be artifacts of small sample
sizes. But for some categories—particularly rails-to-trails and
military overflights—the sample sizes are large, and the success
rates clearly are not flukes. Likewise, in some large categories of
predominantly regulatory classifications—mining cases are the
most notable example—plaintiffs’ success rates are very low. In
fact, the entire pool includes just four successful regulatory takings
claims.148 Not all categories of physical takings cases produce that
sort of success; the flooding cases, for example, have produced a
few plaintiff successes along with many losses, with many claims
not yet resolved.149 Likewise, while plaintiffs in water rights cases
have succeeded, sometimes improbably, in convincing courts to
use physical takings analyses, they still have often lost their cases.150
But in general, physical takings plaintiffs aren’t just more
abundant; they also win much more.

147. See, e.g., A & D Auto Sales, 748 F.3d at 1152–53 (holding that “franchise agreements
are valid and compensable property interests”).
148. Those cases are Plantation Development, Ltd. v. United States, Docket No. 1:12cv-00839 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 6, 2012); Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States., 787 F.3d 1111, 1113
(Fed. Cir. 2015); Made in Detroit, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:06-cv-00457 (Fed. Cl. Jun 09,
2006); and Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Wyatt v. United
States, Docket No. 1:02-cv-00945 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 7, 2002).
149. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (affirming an award in favor of the plaintiff); Alford v. United States, 961 F.3d 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2020) (rejecting the flooding-based claims of lakefront property owners).
150. See infra Section IV.B.

607

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:2 (2022)

TABLE 2: SUCCESS RATES

#

successful

or

success

#

successful

or

cases

cases

unknown

rate

plaintiffs

plaintiffs

unknown

Ps’
success
rate

2

2

0

1.00

11

11

0

1.00

2

2

0

1.00

2

2

0

1.00

overflights

14

6

1

0.46

3393

3290

1

0.97

erosion/avulsion

13

3

7

0.50

47

4

42

0.80

towers

5

4

0

0.80

9

6

0

0.67

rails to trails

108

80

14

0.84

6182

3610

595

0.65

3

1

1

0.50

4

1

2

0.50

site cleanup

10

3

1

0.33

14

5

1

0.38

fire

6

1

0

0.17

24

5

0

0.21

14

3

1

0.23

17

3

1

0.19

11

4

0

0.36

33

4

0

0.12

regulation

4

1

0

0.25

32

2

0

0.06

flooding

35

9

6

0.31

784

16

514

0.06

other

60

4

0

0.07

229

9

0

0.04

mining

44

1

1

0.02

151

1

1

0.01

4

0

0

0.00

299

0

0

0.00

7

0

0

0.00

90

0

0

0.00

19

0

1

0.00

76

0

4

0.00

7

0

0

0.00

66

0

0

0.00

Category
border security
flood

pending

case

pending

control

infrastructure
military

air traffic control

federal property
leasing
contaminated

regulatory
permitting
military
operations (nonoverflight)
food

safety

2008 recession –
govt. mgmt. of
companies
agricultural price
programs
water rights
claims

against

foreign
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sovereigns
general

public

lands

19

0

1

0.00

46

0

1

0.00

tribal resources

6

0

1

0.00

38

0

1

0.00

unclear

27

0

5

0.00

47

0

15

0.00

12

0

0

0.00

24

0

0

0.00

7

0

0

0.00

13

0

0

0.00

10

0

0

0.00

11

0

0

0.00

2

0

0

0.00

9

0

0

0.00

7

0

0

0.00

8

0

0

0.00

7

0

7

40

0

40

intellectual
property
air

traffic

regulation
seizure or civil
forfeiture
landownership
disputes
contract

breach

(not FmHA or
nuclear waste)
Fannie

Mae

Freddie Mac

-

Financial outcomes tell a similar story. Close to ninety percent
of the payments have been in physical takings cases, and nearly
three-quarters of those payments have been in rails-to-trails
cases.151 The fourth-largest category of payments is regulatory
permitting cases, which fit the classic model of regulatory takings
litigation, and those cases have produced returns disproportionate
to their overall numbers. But even with those disproportionate

151. A judgment or settlement in a takings case typically includes three main elements:
just compensation, prejudgment interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. To the extent
possible, I have limited the numbers in payment charts to just compensation (normalized to
2020 dollars). However, some settlements describe a lump sum rather than separating out
these three categories. For that reason, the actual amount of just compensation payments is
likely to be modestly lower than the amounts in this chart.
Additionally, not all of the just compensation payments actually go to the
plaintiffs. Attorneys often handle takings cases on a contingency-fee basis, so part of the
takings award goes to the plaintiffs’ attorneys (in addition to the statutory attorneys’ fees).
Occasionally the contingency fee becomes a litigation issue, and filed documents provide a
window into the attorneys’ payments. See, e.g., Haggart v. Woodley, 809 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (rejecting the use of common fund doctrine in a case governed by a statutory attorneys’
fees provision). But for almost all cases, I have no data showing how plaintiffs and lawyers
split just compensation awards.
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payoffs, regulatory takings cases account for only about four
percent of the overall payments.
FIGURE 2: JUST COMPENSATION PAYMENTS BY CASE CATEGORY
rails to trails
military overflights
flooding
regulatory permitting
all others
military operations (nonoverflight)
flood-control infrastructure
mining
food safety regulation

Total n = $453,058,985
Boring into the financial return data reveals another contrast
between case types. In general, regulatory takings plaintiffs—and
flooding plaintiffs—succeed at much lower rates, but when they do
prevail, they typically walk away with more money—though the
winning cases form a very small sample. The non-flooding physical
taking plaintiffs, in contrast, succeed at much higher rates, and their
consolidated cases produce some huge verdicts, but individual
plaintiffs take less. This is particularly striking with the military
overflight cases, which involve thousands of plaintiffs whose
average take—before the attorneys took whatever contingency fee
they had negotiated—was just over $16,000. Table 3, below, which
includes the top ten most frequent case categories, captures
this disparity.
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TABLE 3: AVERAGE COMPENSATION FOR
SUCCESSFUL PLAINTIFFS

Category

Plaintiffs’
success rate

Average
just
compensation
for
successful plaintiffs
(in 2020 dollars)

rails to trails

0.65

88,203

other

0.04

240,582

mining

0.01

2,990,684

flooding

0.06

1,901,047

water rights

0.00

NA

general public lands

0.00

NA

military overflights

0.97

16,172

erosion/avulsion

0.80

46,041

regulatory permitting

0.19

4,798,595

intellectual property

0.00

NA

military operations (non-overflight)

0.12

996,115

One clarifying point about these numbers is important. I have
treated as successes cases in which plaintiffs prevailed on their
takings claims or in which those claims appear to have been
important drivers of a settlement. The category does not include
cases in which the takings claims failed but the plaintiff still won
the case, which sometimes occurs when plaintiffs are also bringing
breach–of–contract claims.152 For example, many plaintiffs have
argued that the federal government breached contracts and took
property when it failed to take possession of nuclear power plants’
spent nuclear fuel.153 Within my pool of cases, none of those takings

152. See generally John Echeverria, Public Takings of Public Contracts, 36 VT. L. REV. 517
(2012). A few plaintiffs also achieved success through governmental actions not directly
related to the litigation. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Motion for Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice
Pursuant to RCFC 41(a)(2), Acree v. United States, No. 1:06-cv-00798 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 4, 2011)
(explaining that the plaintiffs were dismissing their claims, which were based on actions that
stopped them from litigating war crimes cases, because they had obtained relief through
State Department action).
153. See Echeverria, supra note 152, at 520 (describing the spent nuclear fuel litigation).
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arguments succeeded,154 but some plaintiffs secured large sums
through their breach–of–contract claims,155 and that money is not
included in these statistics.
Somewhat similarly, the pool also excludes cases arising out of
housing projects funded by loans from the Farmers’ Home
Administration. Since the 1980s, hundreds of apartment building
owners have brought takings and breach–of–contract claims after
federal legislation took away their ability to prepay their Farmers’
Home Administration loans.156 Because prepaying those loans
would have freed the apartment building owners to offer
apartments at market rate, rather than as low-income housing, the
denial of the prepayment option limited their revenues and
compelled them to house different renters than they would have
preferred.157 Those cases have produced millions of dollars in
settlements, and the takings claims in some of those cases
theoretically remained live when the settlements occurred.158 But
the cases appear to have been driven primarily by the breach–of–
contract theories; every type of damage claimed can be traced to the
contractual breaches.159 For that reason, I have left out the money
produced by those settlements.
C. Who Litigates, and What Activities Generate Litigation
In addition to tracking case types and outcomes, I also collected
data on the types of plaintiffs who filed cases, the types of law firms
who represented them, and the federal agencies whose actions

154. See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 313, 315–18
(2011) (rejecting the plaintiff’s takings theories); but see id. at 316 n.4 (noting that a few courts
had denied motions to dismiss spent-nuclear-fuel–related takings claims).
155. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 676 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (partially reversing and partially upholding a breach–of–contract damages award).
156. See, e.g., Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 134–37 (2002)
(summarizing the history that led to these claims).
157. See id.
158. See, e.g., Henry Housing Ltd. P’ship v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 250, 255 (2010)
(allowing a takings claim and a breach–of–contract claim to proceed in parallel).
159. See Sonoma Apartment Assocs. v. United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 595, 600 (2015)
(concluding that a takings claim had no viability independent of a breach of contract claim);
see also Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 316
(2007) (describing the Federal Circuit’s approaches to concurrently pled takings and contract claims).
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triggered160 takings litigation. In collecting these data, I had three
primary goals. One was to assess the extent to which big business
and big law are litigating takings claims, as a classic liberal critique
of takings litigation might suggest. A second was to assess the
extent to which takings implicates the central regulatory efforts of
the administrative state. The third was to assess whether takings
litigation instead is brought by the sort of singled-out individuals
highlighted in the David–versus–Goliath narratives often cited by
property rights advocates. There is some evidence consistent with
each story and some that fits poorly with both.
1. The noninvolvement of big business and (mostly) big law
The most striking finding from this part of the analysis is the
absence of big businesses. In the entire pool of cases, I found just
seventeen in which a plaintiff was a publicly traded company and
just three involving Fortune 1000 businesses. Even those numbers
are somewhat deceptively high, for they include spent nuclear fuel
cases, which ultimately were resolved on breach–of–contract
theories rather than as takings, and rails-to-trails cases in which the
business was just another property owner who opted into the
lawsuit rather than an instigator of the case. At least for cases filed
between 2000 and 2014, takings litigation before the Court of
Federal Claims instead was the province of individuals, married
couples, smaller businesses, churches, local governments, and even
the occasional state. Big business, it appears, mostly left the
field alone.
Similarly striking is the number of regulatory fields that appear
largely untouched by takings litigation. The United States federal
government, as the Supreme Court is fond of ominously noting, has
great power and reach;161 hundreds of agencies regulate across a
huge variety of fields.162 Yet the vast majority of those agencies
160. I use “trigger,” rather than “defend,” because in a takings case filed in the Court
of Federal Claims and brought against the federal government, the named defendant always
is the United States, which is represented by Department of Justice attorneys. Agencies also
receive their authority through legislation, which sometimes leaves agencies with little or no
discretion. Consequently, many takings-triggering events derive more from congressional
than administrative choices.
161. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010)
(describing the “vast power” of the federal executive branch).
162. See A–Z Index of U.S. Government Departments and Agencies, https://www.usa.gov/
federal-agencies (last visited Oct. 12, 2021).
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were either untouched by takings litigation filed during the period
of my study or were involved in only a tiny number of cases. And
the cases those agencies trigger almost always involve physical
infrastructure or military activity rather than regulatory oversight.
EPA, for example, has emerged as the preferred bête noir of
antiregulatory politicians and activists, yet it triggered only a
handful of takings cases, almost all arising out of alleged physical
takings of contaminated material at hazardous waste sites.163 The
intersection of the Endangered Species Act and takings litigation
also has generated abundant academic concern,164 yet for cases filed
during the period covered by my study, the two agencies with
primary responsibility for implementing the statute—the Fish and
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service—
defended only a few cases and did not pay a dime in takings
compensation.165 The aggregate amount of money paid in all
regulatory takings cases also is modest; it amounts to a little bit
more than one million dollars per year. This story could change, but
the results to date suggests that the “takings project” has come
nowhere close to taking down the federal regulatory state—or, less
probably, that it completed its takedown prior to 2000.

163. See, e.g., Gadsden Indus. Park, LLC v. United States, 956 F.3d 1362, 1366–67 (Fed.
Cir. 2020) (describing claims that EPA physically took contaminated materials).
164. See, e.g., Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endangered Species
Act, and the Fifth Amendment, 32 ENV’T. L. 551 (2002); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered
Species Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 324 (1997) (discussing
this attention).
165. One of those cases involved limitations on water deliveries from the Klamath
River, and by any reasonable measure it was a major case. See Baley v. United States, 942
F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2019). At the other end of the spectrum is a case brought by a doctor after
a NMFS biologist, not acting in her official capacity, posted negative internet comments
about a “highly purified bovine testicular enzyme” treatment the doctor had given her. Filler
v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 123, 126 (2014). In both cases, the plaintiffs lost.
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TABLE 4: FEDERAL AGENCIES AND NUMBERS OF CASES
Agency
Surface Transportation Board
US Army Corps of Engineers

Number of cases
108
62

Department of the Interior
Bureau of Land Management
Office of Surface Mining
Bureau of Reclamation
Fish and Wildlife Service
Bureau of Indian Affairs
National Park Service
BOEMRE
Department of Agriculture
Forest Service
Farmers’ Home Administration
Natural Resource Conservation
Service
Farm Services Administration

61
19
10
8
7
5
4
1
56
28
18
2
1

Department of Defense (excluding
cases involving only the Army
Corps)
Federal Aviation Administration
DOJ
EPA
Department of Energy
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac
HUD

38

Department
Security
ICE
Coast Guard

5
2
1

of

Homeland

11
9
9
8
7
6

PTO
4
FDA
3
National Marine Fisheries Service
3
Five agencies had two cases filed against them.
Twenty agencies had one case filed against them.

The involvement of law firms presents a more nuanced picture,
but it still suggests a modest role for the business or legal
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establishment—however one might define that phrase. Of the total
cases filed, approximately fifteen percent were litigated at some
point by firms that the Chambers ranked as national leaders or as
leaders in at least three states—a generous but useful proxy
measure for prominent business-oriented law firms.166 Regionally
ranked firms—which I’ve defined as law firms that the Chambers
ranked, but in fewer than three regions—participated in litigating
approximately twenty percent of the total cases filed. Those
numbers may seem to suggest that big law is widely involved in
takings litigation, and indeed it is more involved than big business.
But peering beneath the numbers complicates the story. Two
firms—Arent Fox and Baker Sterchi—account for much of the
nationally ranked and regionally ranked participation, entirely
because of the involvement of a few Missouri-based attorneys
in rails-to-trails cases. The four attorneys who handled most
of those cases have since left the larger firms and now work in very
small firms, neither of which has a Chambers ranking.167 In
other major subject areas, like military overflights, flooding, water
rights, and, more recently, mining, Chambers-rated law firms are
entirely absent.168
TABLE 5: NUMBERS OF CASES HANDLED AND PLAINTIFFS
REPRESENTED BY LAW FIRM TYPE169
Law Firm Type
Cases Handled
Plaintiffs
Represented

Nationally
Ranked
75
1124

Regionally
Ranked
96
4949

Not
Ranked
309
9172

Pro Se
77
84

166. I make no claim that a Chambers ranking serves as a proxy for the quality of the
lawyers involved.
167. See STEWART WALD + MCCULLEY LLC, http://www.swm.legal/ (last visited Oct.
11, 2021); TRUE N.L., https://truenorthlawgroup.com/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
168. In the earlier years of the study period, several mining cases were brought by
ranked firms representing coal mining companies. See, e.g., Cane Tennessee, Inc. v. United
States, 57 Fed. Cl. 115 (2003) (decision in a case litigated by Charles Lettow, a Cleary Gottlieb
partner who went on to become a Court of Federal Claims judge). Large firms have not
handled the more recent mining cases.
169. The total numbers in this table are much higher than the total numbers of cases
and plaintiffs because many cases involve multiple law firms.
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All of this suggests that the aggregate reality of takings
litigation differs from the plans of conservative activists and
the warnings of their liberal critics. Some takings cases do involve
moneyed interests,170 and some involve highly ideological
plaintiffs171 or attorneys closely affiliated with movement
conservatism172—including causes like anti-federal public lands
activism,173 opposition to gay marriage,174 and the Trump
Administration’s clumsy efforts to overturn the 2020 election.175 But
there does not appear to be any sort of broad affiliation between
corporate business interests or law firms and takings litigation.
2. The prevalence of aggregated physical takings claims
The near absence of large corporate interests from federal-court
takings litigation might seem to lend credence to another
170. See, e.g., McCann Holdings, Ltd. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 608 (2013) (ruling in
favor of a business wholly owned by Hugh Culverhouse, Jr.). Culverhouse is a wealthy real
estate investor after whom the University of Alabama’s law school was briefly named. See
Alabama to Refund Hugh Culverhouse Jr.’s $26M Donation After Anti-Abortion Backlash, TAMPA
BAY TIMES (June 8, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/business/alabama-to-refund-hughculverhouse-jrs-26m-donation-after-anti-abortion-backlash-20190607/.
171. See,
e.g.,
Daniel
Martinez—USFS,
WESTERNER
(Nov.
1,
2005),
https://thewesterner.blogspot.com/2005/11/daniel-martinez-usfs-for-backgroundon.html (posting letters from Daniel Martinez, the plaintiff in Martinez v. United States, No.
1:11-cv-00751 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 08, 2011), alleging that the federal government lacks jurisdiction
in the state of Arizona); Complaint, Brokaw v. United States, No. 1:14-cv-00586-MCW
(Fed. Cl. July 10, 2014) (116-page complaint by self-described “[c]onstitutionalists” and
“[t]ax [p]rotestors”).
172. Perhaps the best-known conservative law firm representing plaintiffs is the Pacific
Legal Foundation. See What We Fight For: Property Rights, PAC. LEGAL FOUND.,
https://pacificlegal.org/property-rights/ (describing PLF’s property rights practice, including
takings litigation).
173. See Kirk Siegler, Critic of Federal Public Lands Management to Join Department of the
Interior, NPR (Oct. 15, 2018, 4:47 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/15/657542759/criticof-federal-public-lands-management-to-join-department-of-the-interior (describing Karen
Budd-Falen, who often litigates takings cases).
174. Geoffrey A. Fowler, The Other Lawyer in Gay-Wed Case, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2013, 8:23
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323466204578382792759517454
(describing Charles Cooper, whose firm Cooper & Kirk has litigated several takings cases
and who has a “record of championing conservative causes, including preserving gun rights
and limiting affirmative action and gay rights”).
175. See Robert Patrick, Clayton Lawyer Pushing Trump’s Election Fraud Claims in
Michigan, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.stltoday.com/
news/local/crime-and-courts/clayton-lawyer-pushing-trumps-election-fraud-claims-inmichigan/article_a311f789-c998-5485-b7cd-bb0abf271233.html (discussing the election-law
misadventures of Mark “Thor” Hearne, who also litigates many rails-to-trails cases).
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traditional conservative narrative, in which takings are primarily
about sympathetic, singled-out Davids standing up to the Goliath
regulatory state.176 But at the federal level, the reality is somewhat
different. Litigants generally participate in aggregated groups, not
as individuals, and take on nonregulatory actions.
Takings rhetoric puts heavy emphasis on individuals.177 In the
classic stories, the prototypical plaintiff stands alone or with his
family against the giant and malevolent regulatory state.178 Yet
most federal-court takings litigants participate in aggregate
litigation. Within my pool of cases, the average case involves
twenty-four plaintiffs. The average successful case involves
seventy-seven plaintiffs, some of which may be collective entities
like municipalities or homeowners’ associations.179 In a country
with over 300 million people, a small group might still seem singled
out; the difference between seventy-seven and one might hold only
modest significance. But many of these groups fit within even
larger categories given similar treatment.180 Additionally, in some
ways the bare statistics understate the prevalence of aggregate
litigation. Some of the cases that include only individuals or small
groups of plaintiffs were brought as purported class actions, and
the attorneys would have attempted to include many additional
plaintiffs if the cases had survived motions to dismiss.181
Of course, far from all of the plaintiffs participate in aggregated
cases. While most of the plaintiffs participate in aggregate
litigation, the median number of plaintiffs in my pool of takings
cases is one, which means that many individual cases are filed.
These cases are an esoteric group, but some clearly do fit within a
classic narrative of a single individual or small group up against a
gigantic and indifferent state. To provide a few examples, there are
border security cases in which federal agents seem to have gone
176. See supra notes 123–125 and accompanying text.
177. See Michael Pappas, Singled Out, 76 MD. L. REV. 122, 124 (2016); Pennell v. City of
San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22–24 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 123.
179. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 814 F.3d 1299, 1299–1300 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (listing
plaintiffs—including multiple golf clubs and homeowners’ associations in addition to
individuals and businesses—in a major rails-to-trails case).
180. See infra notes 190–205 (describing the origins of rails-to-trails litigation).
181. See, e.g., Hair v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 279, 279 (2002) (describing claims
brought “on behalf of a large putative class of United States citizens who were either killed
or injured by the Japanese armed forces during World War II”).
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where they pleased on the plaintiffs’ property whenever they saw
fit to do so;182 a case in which the military took shipping containers
it knew belonged to the plaintiffs, shipped them from Afghanistan
to Okinawa, and then claimed they were lost;183 and several cases
in which the Federal Aviation Administration left air traffic control
towers on the plaintiffs’ land even after its leases expired.184 These
cases do validate the basic idea that sometimes the federal
government acts like a behemoth with little concern for individual
property rights. But even these cases involve physical, not
regulatory, takings claims.
IV. THEMES AND EXAMPLES
If the central story of federal takings litigation is not the
conventional tale—in which takings cases lie at the locus of a
high-stakes clash between individuals and the regulatory state,
with regulatory takings doctrine at the center of the fight—then
what is it? This Part uses a qualitative exploration of key areas of
takings litigation to develop an alternative thematic explanation of
takings litigation against the federal government. It argues that a
defining theme of the field is an effort by litigants on all sides to
create and then place cases within categorical boxes. That may seem
like nothing new—a previous generation of takings litigation and
scholarship focused on the boundaries of the Lucas categorical
box185—but Lucas isn’t the issue anymore. Obtaining a physical
takings framework often is, but that isn’t the whole story either.
Because obtaining a physical takings framework often isn’t a given
and sometimes isn’t always enough to produce a win, plaintiffs—
and, more importantly, their lawyers—are also trying to establish
subcategories of successful litigation into which subsequent cases
can be fit. They are trying, in other words, to create specialized
cookie cutters, not, as the Supreme Court’s takings rhetoric might
suggest, to engage with the evidentiary and equitable uniqueness
of each case.

182. See D & D Landholdings v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 329, 336 (2008).
183. Textainer Equipment Mgmt. Ltd. v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 708, 711 n.3 (2014).
184. E.g., Complaint, Takaho Estates, LLC v. United States, No. 1:08-cv-00212 (Fed. Cl.
Mar. 27, 2008) (No. 08-212 L).
185. See Daniel Farber, Requiem for a Heavyweight: The Decline and Fall of Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 71 FLA. L. REV. F. 212, 216–17 (2020) (describing Lucas’s fall from importance).
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This is a broad generalization about a diverse pool of cases, and
some cases don’t fit it. Some are really just creative one-offs,
in which lawyers appear to be going for one big score rather
than trying to create a lasting business model.186 Many others,
including but not limited to the many pro se cases, seem best
explained by some combination of legal misunderstanding and
anti-governmental animus.187 For that reason, this Part closes by
discussing cases that do not fit into categorical boxes. But first, it
discusses three types of takings litigation in which categories are
crucially important.
A. Rails-to-Trails
Even as law professors have churned out reams of writing
about takings cases, few articles have mentioned rails-to-trails
litigation.188 The Supreme Court, which in 1990 helped create the
rails-to-trails litigation mini-industry,189 appears to have taken no
notice of the phenomenon in the years since. Yet, as the statistics
above make clear, rails-to-trails cases are where the action lies—and
where the money is—with the 2000–2014 cohort of cases producing
over $300 million in just compensation payments and over $44
million in attorneys’ fees, with more cases still to be resolved. As
those sums suggest, rails-to-trails cases also provide a model for
plaintiff-side success litigating regulatory takings claims.
Rails-to-trails decisions have their origins in the right-of-way
acquisition practices of railroad companies. Building a railroad
requires acquiring lots of land, often from private owners, and rail
companies did not always acquire that land in fee simple.190
Instead, they often acquired easements, some of which by their
terms would revert to the fee simple landowner if the railroad
186. See, e.g., Love Terminal Partners, L.P. v. United States, 889 F.3d 1331, 1336, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2744 (2019) (reversing a $133.5 million just compensation
award for a struggling airport).
187. See infra notes 306–311 and accompanying text.
188. One law professor—Danaya Wright of the University of Florida—has written nine
articles about rails-to-trails litigation. See, e.g., Danaya C. Wright, Eminent Domain, Exactions,
and Railbanking: Can Recreational Trails Survive the Court’s Fifth Amendment Takings
Jurisprudence?, 26 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 399 (2001). Her work aside, attention to rails-to-trails
cases in the general takings literature is minimal.
189. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
190. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION: ISSUES
RELATED TO PRESERVING INACTIVE RAIL LINES AS TRAILS 3–4 (1999).
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company abandoned rail use.191 By the late twentieth century, a few
changes lent unforeseen significance to those reversionary
interests. Rail usage declined, and rail lines all over the country
were unused; many were falling into disrepair.192 In that decline,
some entrepreneurial activists saw an opportunity: what if those
abandoned rail lines could be converted into recreational trails?
The change seems like a win-win, for railroad companies could
shed themselves of unwanted land and communities could gain
valuable amenities.
In the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983,193
Congress laid the legal groundwork for that change. It allowed
railroad companies to “railbank” their lands, which meant
enrolling them in a program to allow conversion to recreational use
while still retaining the right to reclaim the land and reconstruct a
rail line.194 The Surface Transportation Board (STB) holds authority
to approve or reject railbanking applications. But the initiative for
rails-to-trails conversions instead typically comes from private
actors and local government sponsors, as does the funding to build
and maintain the trail, though local sponsors obtain much of that
funding by applying for federal grants.195 The STB approves
railbanking applications as a matter of course so long as the
railbanked segment meets basic eligibility criteria and the sponsor
commits to fund the conversion.196 Because of the program, tens of
thousands of miles of rail line have been converted to
recreational use.197

191. Id.
192. See Preseault, 494 U.S. at 5 (“In 1920, the Nation’s railway system reached its peak
of 272,000 miles; today only about 141,000 miles are in use, and experts predict that 3,000
miles will be abandoned every year through the end of this century.”).
193. National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98–11, 97 Stat. 48 (1983).
194. See Danaya C. Wright, A Requiem for Regulatory Takings: Reclaiming Eminent Domain
for Constitutional Property Claims, 49 ENV’T L. 307, 367 (2019) (describing railbanking).
195. John L. Crompton & Sarah Nicholls, The Impact of Greenways and Trails on Proximate
Property Values: An Updated Review, 37 J. PARK & RECREATION ADMIN. 89, 92 (2019) (describing
funding mechanisms).
196. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 190, at 5 (describing the STB’s
limited role); STB, 1996/1997 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1998), https://prod.stb.gov/wpcontent/uploads/files/docs/annualReports/ActivityReport1996-1997.pdf (describing the
STB’s role as “ministerial”).
197. See
RAILS-TO-TRAILS CONSERVANCY,
United
States
Rail-Trail
Stats,
https://www.railstotrails.org/our-work/united-states/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2021) (stating
that 24,833 miles of conversions have occurred).
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But in the late 1980s, landowners began litigating their
objections to these conversions. The flagship case was brought
by the Preseaults, a couple from Burlington, Vermont.198 The
Preseaults argued that railbanking was a federal-law contrivance
that deprived them of their reversionary rights under state law.199
This, they argued, was a taking. The Preseaults initially asserted
that the whole rails-to-trails program was facially unconstitutional,
and in 1990, the United States Supreme Court rejected that
position.200 But the Court did not reject the possibility of takings
claims; instead, it merely held that such claims should be raised in
the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act.201 The Preseaults
then did just that. The Court of Federal Claims ruled for the
government,202 as did the Federal Circuit panel that initially
heard the appeal.203 But the full Federal Circuit granted en banc
review.204 In what might well be the most consequential takings
decision the Federal Circuit has ever issued, a divided court held
for the Preseaults, finding that the STB had physically taken their
land.205 That holding provided a blueprint for copycat litigation.
Over the course of my study period, these cases account for the
majority of takings claims filed and an even larger majority of the
successful claims.
Beyond the numbers of cases and plaintiffs, several other
features of rails-to-trails litigation also stand out. One is how closely
akin rails-to-trails cases are to mass tort cases.206 Many of the
individual claims are small: the average rails-to-trails plaintiff
receives an award of approximately $50,000, and a few relatively

198. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1531–32 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (describing the
Preseaults’ land).
199. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1990).
200. Id. at 5.
201. Id. at 17 (“[P]etitioners’ failure to make use of the available Tucker Act remedy
renders their takings challenge to the ICC’s order premature. We need not decide whether a
taking occurred in this case.”).
202. Preseault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 69, 96 (1992).
203. Preseault v. United States, 66 F.3d 1190, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
204. Id.
205. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1550–51 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
206. This is also true of the military overflight cases, which I do not discuss in depth
here. They involve well-established takings theories, which trace their lineage to United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), but the basic claim—that low-flying planes interfered with the
use and enjoyment of property—sounds like a classic nuisance.
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lucrative cases skew that number upwards.207 In most cases, the
average successful plaintiff receives closer to $10,000 in just
compensation, and not all plaintiffs succeed. Few of these claims
would make economic sense to litigate on their own, and lawyers
don’t do that. Instead, as with mass torts, the lawyers bring cases
on behalf of dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of plaintiffs along a
converted rail line, sometimes aggregating claims into a single
named case and sometimes using class actions.208 The cases also
appear to be initiated by lawyers rather than plaintiffs. The law
firms that handle these cases talk openly about how they monitor
rails-to-trails conversions and recruit plaintiffs for their cases—and
about how many of their clients don’t actually mind the presence
of the trail.209 For the attorneys, these efforts appear to be lucrative.
The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition
Policies Act of 1970 allows attorney fee awards for successful
plaintiffs in inverse condemnation cases,210 and over the study
period, rails-to-trails cases produced at least $44 million in attorney
fee awards. In addition, the lawyers use contingency fee
agreements in at least some of their cases.211 The result is that a
big-money win for plaintiffs can produce a small fortune for the
small group of attorneys who litigated the case.212 And even if the

207. In Joint Compromise Settlement Agreement Between Plaintiffs and the United
States, Haggart v. United States, No. 1:09-cv-00103 (2009) (No. 09-103L), 253 successful
plaintiffs shared a $133,494,970 award (normalized to 2020 dollars), for an average award of
just below $530,000 for each successful plaintiff.
208. The use of class actions isn’t unique to rails-to-trails cases. The data set also includes
class actions from flooding cases, military overflight cases, and Chrysler-bankruptcy cases, to
provide a few examples. Some have over a thousand individual plaintiffs.
209. See, e.g., Practice Areas: Rails-to-Trails, STEWART WALD + MCCULLEY LLC,
http://www.swm.legal/what-we-do (last visited Oct. 12, 2021) (“SWM . . . advises
landowners if their land is in danger of being taken under the Trails Act . . . .”); Property
Rights/Rails to Trails, BAKER, STERCHI, COWDEN & RICE LLC, https://www.bscrlaw.com/?t=5&LPA=3001&format=xml&p=5253 (last visited Oct. 12, 2021) (“We monitor
Rails-to-Trails conversions in every state . . . .”).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 4654(c).
211. See Catherine Martin, Three Top Rainmakers Break Off from Baker Sterchi, MO. LAWS.
MEDIA (Apr. 15, 2015), https://molawyersmedia.com/2015/04/15/three-top-rainmakersbreak-off-from-baker-sterchi/ (describing a case “that settled for $33 million in 2013 and
included a nearly $11 million contingency fee”).
212. See Haggart v. Woodley, 809 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (describing a dispute
over a $35 million fee award, which came out of a case with a $110 million settlement).
The Federal Circuit overturned that award, see id. at 1359, and an alternative award is still
being litigated.
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just compensation for the plaintiffs is quite modest, the attorneys
may still obtain a seven-figure fee award.213
In addition, the issues raised in the litigation are quite different
from what conventional wisdom might lead one to expect. In the
kind of Penn Central case lawyers tend to view as typifying takings
litigation, courts must conduct a broad-ranging inquiry into the
degree of economic impact caused by the governmental action and
into the relationship between that action and policy concerns
grounded in fairness and justice. None of that happens in
rails-to-trails cases. Instead, the key, and often only, question is
whether the plaintiff holds a reversionary property interest.214
Answering that question may require a detailed inquiry, but the
inquiry turns entirely on state property law and the terms of the
relevant deeds. There is none of the weighing of interests and
equities that might accompany a more traditional regulatory
takings claim. Indeed, many rails-to-trails cases now settle without
the court doing any legal analysis at all.215
If courts were to explore the equity issues underlying
rails-to-trails conversions, they might find a complex picture
somewhat at odds with prevailing ideas of takings litigation. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly said that takings litigation exists
to compensate people who are unfairly singled out and harmed
by government actions that provide collective benefits.216
Rails-to-trails conversions partially fit that model, for they do
provide collective benefits.217 But it’s hard to claim that tens of

213. E.g., Judgment, Fauvergue v. United States, No. 1:08-cv-00431 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 23,
2013) (No. 08-431 L) ($119,292 in just compensation and $1,321,000 in attorney fees);
Stipulation of Settlement and Dismissal, Buford v. United States, No. 1:09-cv-00121-EJD
(Fed. Cl. May 1, 2014) (No. 09-121 L) ($32,843.55 in just compensation and $251,732.31 in
attorneys’ fees); see also Campbell v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 65, 70 (2018) (“The amount of
compensation ultimately agreed to, without interest, was only $122,466, compared to
$1,187,470 claimed for attorney fees.”).
214. See Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
Cecilia Fex, The Elements of Liability in a Trails Act Taking: A Guide to the Analysis, 38 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 673 (2011).
215. See, e.g., Campbell, 138 Fed. Cl. at 70 (describing a case with “no trial and no
dispositive motion practice. . . . no contested motions, briefing, or argument on any issues
related to liability or compensation”).
216. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22–24 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. See, e.g., J.M. Bowker, John C. Bergstrom & Joshua Gill, Estimating the Economic
Value and Impacts of Recreational Trails: A Case Study of the Virginia Creeper Rail Trail, 13
TOURISM ECON. 241 (2007) (finding a large and positive community impact).
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thousands of landowners are being “singled out.” And whether
those owners are being harmed is debatable. Before the conversions
occur, the landowners have abandoned often-deteriorating rail
lines crossing their property, and the land underlying the rail line
still is in the railroad’s hands—conditions that may well have
factored into the purchase price of the property.218 After the
conversion is complete, the resumption of rail traffic is exceedingly
unlikely, and property owners instead have direct access to a
recreational amenity. That access comes with a potential downside;
other people will use the recreational trail, and there are likely to be
more people walking or biking on a trail than walked on the unused
tracks.219 But economic studies suggest that the conversions
generally increase the value of the burdened property, albeit not
with complete uniformity.220
None of that means that the rails-to-trails program is
fundamentally flawed. I do not have data on the number of
potentially reversionary landowners who have not brought takings
claims. That number may dwarf the number of owners that have
sued, which would suggest that takings payment may be a
modestly expensive (and very unevenly allocated) way of
smoothing the path toward a nearly 25,000-mile (and counting)
network of recreational trails.221 For the public, that might not be
such a bad deal. Also, not every plaintiff who brings a rails-to-trails
claim succeeds. Indeed, the potential mother of all rails-to-trails
claims—challenging the conversion that led to New York City’s
now-famous High Line Park—was unsuccessful.222

218. And before the line fell into disuse, the land hosted an active rail line.
219. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“On warm
weekends up to two hundred people an hour go through the Preseaults’ property. . . . On
one occasion Mr. Preseault was nearly run over by a cyclist as he walked across the path.”);
see also Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Some might think it
better to have people strolling on one’s property than to have a freight train rumbling
through. But that is not the point. The landowner’s grant authorized one set of uses, not
the other.”).
220. See Crompton & Nicholls, supra note 195 (reviewing multiple studies and finding
that landowners generally perceived proximity to trails to either increase or not affect
property values, though such perceptions were less prevalent in rural areas, and finding that
hedonic analyses suggest an increase in value from proximity to trails).
221. See Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, supra note 197.
222. Romanoff Equities, Inc. v. United States, 815 F.3d 809, 810 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 597 (2016).

625

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:2 (2022)

Nevertheless, the rails-to-trails program has clearly allowed a
small group of lawyers to monetize and streamline takings
litigation in fairly predictable and very lucrative ways. They have
done so through aggregation and by finding a legal standard that
circumvents the need for the sort of equitable, fact-intensive
analysis that makes regulatory takings claims expensive and
unpredictable. In that sense, the rails-to-trails cases provide a sort
of gold standard for the takings bar.
B. Water Rights
A second area in which takings lawyers have sought to create
cookie-cutter patterns for successful litigation is in the realm of
water rights regulation. Here, too, a central goal has been to craft a
template under which regulatory takings inquiries can be avoided
and plaintiffs—and their attorneys—can predictably win.
In the United States, water, like land, is allocated through
systems of property rights.223 With some possible and limited
exceptions, every consumptive water use has, at its roots, a
property claim to the use of surface water or groundwater.224 Also
like land rights, and sometimes to an even greater extent, those
water rights are highly regulated.225 Much of that regulation comes
from state agencies.226 But some comes from the federal
government. Most importantly, the United States government
manages the land where most water in the western United States
first precipitates, and its land management policies therefore have

223. See Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights, and the Future of Water Law, 61
U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 260 (1990) (“Water rights are property.”).
224. See JOSEPH L. SAX, BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT H. ABRAMS,
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 27–590 (6th ed. 2018) (describing property rights
in water).
225. See generally id. (discussing water rights and regulation); see, e.g., United States v.
Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945) (“Rights, property or otherwise, which are
absolute against the world are certainly rare, and water rights are not among them.”); United
States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (“[A]ll
water rights are subject to government regulation.”).
226. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978) (describing “the consistent
thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress”). But see
David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws and Local
Decisions Eclipsed the States’ Role?, 20 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 3, 8 (2001) (asserting that federal
deference to state water authority is largely mythical).

626

627

The Realities of Takings Litigation

implications for water rights.227 The United States Bureau of
Reclamation manages massive water projects and delivers a
significant portion of the agricultural irrigation water used in the
western United States.228 And the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service regulate water
uses that impact threatened and endangered species.229 That
combination of property rights and regulatory oversight generates
takings claims.
Takings claims involving water rights have arisen from two
main types of fact patterns. In one type, environmental regulators
limit water users’ ability to divert water from rivers or streams
containing threatened or endangered species, and the water users
sue, alleging a taking. The classic example of this type of case is
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, a case arising
out of federal restrictions on deliveries from California’s State
Water Project (and a case filed before my study period).230 The other
fact pattern involves decisions by land management agencies that
restrict ranchers’ ability to graze their cattle on public lands, often
because the ranchers have illegally overgrazed the land or refused
to pay grazing fees.231 The ranchers then often sue the United States,
alleging that by restricting private grazing on public lands, the
government has taken those ranchers’ rights to the water on
those lands.232
In these cases, the plaintiffs have pursued a consistent legal
strategy: they have tried to convince the Court of Claims and the
Federal Circuit to analyze their claims as potential physical
takings.233 Those arguments have achieved some success. In Tulare
Lake, the Court of Claims concluded that, because a regulatory
restriction on water use “completely eviscerates the right itself,” the
227. U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., PNW-GTR-812, WATER, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND FORESTS 6
(2010) (“National forests alone provide . . . over half the water in the West.”).
228. See About Us — Fact Sheet, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION https://www.usbr.gov/
main/about/fact.html (May 6, 2021).
229. See generally Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small
Harms, 64 FLA. L. REV. 141 (2012) (describing the agencies’ implementation of the Endangered
Species Act, with a focus on fish species).
230. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 313 (2001).
231. See, e.g., Estate of Hage v. United States, 687 F.3d 1281, 1284–85 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 805–06 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
232. E.g., Estate of Hage, 687 F.3d at 1285; Colvin Cattle Co., 468 F.3d at 806.
233. See, e.g., Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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claims should be analyzed as physical takings.234 The plaintiffs
prevailed, the Department of Justice declined to appeal, and the
United States paid out $17 million in just compensation and
attorneys’ fees.235 Tulare Lake then became the model strategy, and
in subsequent cases involving regulatory restrictions on water use,
plaintiffs repeatedly asked for a similar physical takings
standard.236 Indeed, sometimes they openly conceded that their
entire case depended on the use of a physical takings standard and
that a Penn Central analysis would be fatal to their claims.237
As a legal matter, this position is shaky. Regulatory action
cannot physically invade a water right.238 Nor do the regulatory
actions at issue in these cases appropriate the water rights at issue.
To appropriate something means to take ownership of it, and in all
of the recent water rights-takings cases, regulators have simply
imposed regulations partially restricting use rather than actually
claiming the water rights, much like land use regulators who
restrict development on a property rather than taking title to an
easement.239 Supreme Court precedent also does not support the
plaintiffs’ position.240 In several Court of Federal Claims and
Federal Circuit decisions, the courts’ selection of a physical takings
standard purports to derive from three mid-twentieth-century
Supreme Court cases, which the Federal Circuit has described as
“provid[ing] guidance on the demarcation between regulatory and
physical takings analysis with respect to [water] rights.”241 In fact,
234. Tulare Lake Basin, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319–20.
235. See Raymond Dake, Trout of Bounds: The Effects of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals’
Misguided Fifth Amendment Takings Analysis in Casitas Municipal Water District v. United
States, 36 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 59, 93 (2011).
236. E.g., Baley v. United States, 942 F.3d 1312, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (noting that the
plaintiffs in Klamath River litigation requested a physical-taking standard); CRV
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1241, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (arguing that restricting
the plaintiffs’ access to a waterway was a physical taking).
237. See Casitas, 543 F.3d at 1283.
238. See Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 132 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (noting this reality).
239. See Benson, supra note 164, at 583–84 (contrasting Tulare Lake to cases in which the
government did physically invade land or did legally appropriate property).
240. See, e.g., Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 82 U.S. 500, 502, 506–13 (1873) (finding that a
requirement to spill water through an already-constructed dam did not create a taking or
unlawfully infringe the dam owners’ property rights).
241. Casitas, 543 F.3d at 1289. The cases are Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); United
States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950); and Int’l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
399 (1931).
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none of the three cases discuss the distinction between physical
and regulatory takings, and the Supreme Court has instead
applied a regulatory takings framework to claims that restrictions
on water withdrawals were takings.242 The Court of Claims also has
suggested that a physical taking standard is appropriate because
water use regulation has physical effects akin to those of a direct
physical taking.243 But most of the regulatory restrictions at issue in
classic regulatory takings cases have such physical effects.244
Pennsylvania Coal Company, for example, had to leave physical
coal in the ground, where it was used to prevent subsidence, rather
than exercising its property right to remove it,245 and Penn Central
Railroad Company had to leave physical space that it owned
unoccupied.246 Yet these are iconic regulatory takings cases, and the
Court has specifically cautioned against shoehorning regulatory
takings claims into a physical taking framework.247
Nevertheless, these arguments have sometimes succeeded. In
Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, for example, a
divided Federal Circuit adopted a physical taking standard.248 In a
somewhat confusing opinion, which seems to rely heavily on the
fact that the water in question was diverted from the water district’s
diversion canal and into a fish ladder, the court held that a physical
taking standard was appropriate.249 That case alone does not
suggest that all regulatory restrictions on water rights should be
242. Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1908). In Casitas, the
Federal Circuit distinguished McCarter, arguing that the case turned on the scope of the
property right and did not involve a regulatory takings analysis. 543 F.3d at 1294–95. But
McCarter describes the scope of the underlying rights and the possibility of regulation of
those rights as two alternative grounds for its holding:
Whether it be said that such an interest justifies the cutting down by statute,
without compensation, in the exercise of the police power, of what otherwise
would be private rights of property, or that apart from statute those rights do not
go to the height of what the defendant seeks to do, the result is the same.
209 U.S. at 356.
243. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 320 (2001).
244. See Benson, supra note 165, at 584–85.
245. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412–13 (1922).
246. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107–18 (1978).
247. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Auth., 535 U.S. 302, 324 (2002);
see also Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 362 (2015) (“A physical taking of raisins
and a regulatory limit on production may have the same economic impact on a grower. The
Constitution, however, is concerned with means as well as ends.”).
248. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
249. Id. at 1291.
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analyzed as physical takings; the Casitas court distinguished its
diversion-from-a-diversion facts from cases with traditional
regulatory restrictions, pointedly noting that “the government did
not merely require some water to remain in stream.”250 But some
subsequent Court of Federal Claims decisions have dispensed with
that nuance. In litigation involving the Klamath River,251 and also
in Sacramento Grazing Association v. United States,252 Court of Federal
Claims judges have stated that regulatory restrictions on water
diversions should be analyzed as physical takings.253 The courts
have not been consistent, with other decisions explicitly rejecting
this position,254 and the more sweeping statements have come from
individual Court of Claims judges, not from the Federal Circuit
itself.255 To date, no published state court decision has ever
endorsed this theory.256 So the issue is hardly resolved. But
attorneys are still trying to establish a categorical rule, specific to
water rights cases, that would avoid Penn Central’s questions about
equity and economic impact and make claims very easy for
plaintiffs to win.
To date, and despite these preliminary victories, plaintiffs have
ultimately lost every water rights case that is within my 2000–2014

250. Id.
251. Klamath Irrigation v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 722, 737 (2016).
252. 135 Fed. Cl. 168, 169 (2017). This opinion is notable in another respect: its opening
sentence is a gratuitous, and factually inaccurate, shout-out to the armed occupation of the
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge by right-wing activists. See id. at 170–71 (stating that the
activists had “unsuccessfully attempted to find common ground with environmental groups
and officials from Oregon’s Malheur National Wildlife Refuge for over a decade”). In fact,
the occupants, many of whom were from other states, were not affiliated with local groups
that had been seeking compromises. See John D. Leshy & John D. Echeverria, The Trump
Judiciary Threatens Federal Public Lands, HILL (Nov. 28, 2017, 5:20 PM), https://thehill.com/
opinion/energy-environment/362191-the-trump-judiciary-threatens-federal-public-lands
(“Almost every assertion of fact in that sentence is stunningly wrong . . . .”).
253. Sacramento Grazing Ass’n, 135 Fed. Cl. at 202–07; Klamath Irrigation, 129 Fed. Cl. at
733–37; see also Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202 (2008), rev’d, 685 Fed. App’x.
927 (Fed. Cir. 2017), rev’d, 687 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
254. E.g., Clear Creek Cmty Servs. Dist. v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 223, 262 (2017).
255. See Casitas, 543 F.3d at 1291 (emphasizing, before selecting a physical taking
framework, that “the government did not merely require some water to remain in stream”).
256. See, e.g., Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 132 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (“The reasoning is flawed because in that case the government’s passive
restriction, which required the water users to leave water in the stream, did not constitute a
physical invasion or appropriation . . . . Tulare Lake’s reasoning disregards the hallmarks of a
categorical physical taking.”).
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pool and that has reached a final resolution.257 That includes the
cases in which courts have prescribed a physical takings
framework. In both Casitas and the Klamath litigation, the Court of
Federal Claims ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had no right
to use the allegedly taken water,258 and the Federal Circuit
affirmed.259 That pattern of losses may reduce interest in water
rights litigation; the physical-regulatory taking distinction
ultimately may not matter. But the effort to craft a special
categorical rule for water rights cases also could—if not checked by
reviewing courts—place water rights litigation in the rails-to-trails
cases’ lucrative (for plaintiffs’ attorneys) footsteps.
C. Bailouts and Bankruptcies
When attorneys think about takings, they tend to think about
real property, and most of the takings claims that come before the
Court of Federal Claims are consistent with that expectation.260 But
in recent years, perhaps the highest-stakes claims have involved
shares of corporate ownership. During and after the 2008 financial
crisis, the federal government took on a series of roles that
straddled boundaries between public and private and between
proprietary owner and regulator.261 The decisions it made in that
capacity have produced a series of takings claims, many of which
are still being litigated.262 The potential value of those claims runs
257. E.g., Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 806–08 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
Goodrich v. United States, 434 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (upholding dismissal of a
water rights-grazing claim); see also Estate of Hage, 687 F.3d at 1284–85, 1292 (rejecting a
takings claim filed before my study period).
258. Baley v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 619, 668–80 (2017) (holding that downstream
tribes had superior rights to the water flows at issue); Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United
States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 470 (2011) (finding the case unripe because “there has been no
encroachment on plaintiff’s beneficial use to date”).
259. Baley, 942 F.3d at 1312, cert denied, 141 S. Ct. 133 (2020); Casitas Mun. Water Dist.
v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
260. For example, all of the rails-to-trails, flooding, and military overflights cases
involve ownership of land.
261. See Nestor M. Davidson, Resetting the Baseline of Ownership: Takings and Investor
Expectations After the Bailouts, 75 MD. L. REV. 722, 727–29 (2016); Steven Davidoff Solomon &
David Zaring, After the Deal: Fannie, Freddie, and the Financial Crisis Aftermath, 95 B.U. L. REV.
371, 378–87 (2015).
262. See, e.g., Piszel v. United States, 833 F.3d 1366, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Cacciapalle v.
United States, 148 Fed. Cl. 745, 745 (2020) (dismissing claims based on actions taken during
the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; the case is currently on appeal);
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easily into the tens of billions.263 And while they involve very
distinct subject matter from the rails-to-trails and water cases, a
common thread—the quest for a physical and categorical takings
test—runs through each.
The most prominent of these cases arise from the complicated
saga of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Both entities are
government-created corporations designed to handle home
mortgages.264 For years prior to the 2008 financial crisis, they
occupied a cozy gray area between public and private status.265
They functioned much like private companies, with private
ownership and generously compensated management, but their
federally created status also brought perks, which helped them
produce steady and substantial profits.266 The financial crisis drove
both entities to the brink of insolvency, and they would have failed
if the government had not infused cash and created a new entity—
the Federal Home Finance Authority (FHFA)—to operate as a
conservator for the distressed giants.267 Through the FHFA, the
federal government took ownership of nearly eighty percent of
both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.268 But the federal government
did not entirely nationalize the companies, and instead allowed just
over twenty percent of the stock in each to be held by private
entities.269 Investors bought those shares, and within a few years,
they may have seemed—to a degree that remains in dispute—like

Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl. 1, 1 (2019) (dismissing some claims and
allowing others to proceed; the decision is currently on appeal); Colonial Chevrolet Co. v.
United States, 145 Fed. Cl. 243, 243 (2019) (dismissing claims arising out of the federal
government’s bailout of Chrysler; the case is currently on appeal).
263. Nick Timiraos, Lawsuit Challenges Takeover of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, WALL ST. J. (June
10, 2013), https://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323949904578537994000684874.html
(describing claims seeking $41 billion).
264. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-637, FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE
MAC: EFFORTS TO PROMOTE DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION 6–7 (2020) (summarizing Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac’s activities).
265. See Julie Andersen Hill, Bailouts and Credit Cycles: Fannie, Freddie, and the Farm
Credit System, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1, 31 (describing the rather favorable position in which the
companies sat).
266. Solomon & Zaring, supra note 261, at 379.
267. See History of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Conservatorships, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY,
https://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Pages/History-of-Fannie-Mae—FreddieConservatorships.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2021).
268. Solomon & Zaring, supra note 261, at 382.
269. Id.
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promising investments; in 2012 both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
returned to profitability.270
For the private investors, that promise never paid out. In 2012,
the FHFA changed the terms of the conservatorship, directing
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to pay all of their profits to the
United States Treasury rather than paying dividends to private
stockholders.271 There is some evidence—again, this is disputed—
that the instigators of this “net worth sweep” thought Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac would never be able to fully pay back the public’s
investment and would soon be wound down, and that the goal
was simply to minimize public losses.272 If those expectations did
exist, they were mistaken.273 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have
continued on; the subsequent payments have been worth billions
of dollars; and the private investors have received—and, unless the
net worth sweep goes away—will receive no dividend payments.274
Many of the investors sued, bringing a variety of claims in multiple
courts.275 Among their claims were arguments that the federal
government’s net worth sweep has effected a taking.276
The outcome of these takings claims remains uncertain.277 The
Court of Federal Claims has dismissed many of them but has

270. Id. at 385.
271. Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl. 1, 19 (2019); see Adam B.
Badawi & Anthony J. Casey, The Fannie and Freddie Bailouts Through the Corporate Lens, 10
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 443, 444–45 (2014) (noting widespread criticism, including from bedfellows
as strange as Richard Epstein and Ralph Nader).
272. See Solomon & Zaring, supra note 261, at 384 (quoting a Treasury official who
described the sweep as a step toward “winding down” Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac);
Gretchen Morgenson, The Secrets of a Bailout with No Exit, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2016, at BU1
(arguing that internal documents show regulators anticipated the firms “were about to enter
‘the golden years’ of profitability”).
273. See Morgenson, supra note 272.
274. Id.; see Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 13-1053, 2018 WL
4680197, *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2018).
275. See Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 553 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), cert granted, 141
S. Ct. 193, 193 (addressing a wide variety of non-takings claims); Perry Cap. LLC v. Mnuchin,
864 F.3d 591, 598 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (describing statutory, tort, and contract claims); Robinson
v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 876 F.3d 220, 220 (6th Cir. 2017); Roberts v. Fed. Hous. Fin.
Agency, 889 F.3d 397, 397 (7th Cir. 2018).
276. See, e.g., Wash. Fed. v. United States, 149 Fed. Cl. 281, 285 (2020).
277. The sweep also generated cases that do not involve any takings claims. One of
those cases is now before the United States Supreme Court. See Mnuchin v. Collins, 141 S. Ct.
193 (2020) (granting cert).
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allowed a few claims to proceed.278 The court also certified its
decisions for interlocutory appeals 279but the Federal Circuit has yet
to issue a decision. In all likelihood, the litigation will continue for
a long time, and even if some plaintiffs do eventually prevail, the
takings claims may not be their path to victory.280 My goal here also
is not to say what the outcome of the cases should be. That issue
already has received substantial and thoughtful academic
disagreement. Some commentators argue that even though the
plaintiff hedge funds are “not particularly attractive” actors who
deserve to receive much less than they are requesting, the
government’s actions violated fairness principles embedded in
both administrative and corporate law, and some recovery
is appropriate.281 Others have argued that the plaintiffs were
opportunistic purchasers who should have understood—and in
fact probably did understand—that there could be no
reasonable investment-backed expectation of profit from cheap
stocks offered by distressed, heavily-regulated, and mostly
government-owned entities.282
For present purposes, what is striking, instead, is the mode of
argument used by the plaintiffs’ attorneys. Like good lawyers, they
have hedged their bets, pressing both Penn Central and Lucas
arguments in their brief opposing the government’s motion to
dismiss.283 But those are backup claims, and their lead takings
argument is different. It is that the government, through its
dividend sweep, simply appropriated otherwise private

278. Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl. 1, 53 (2019) (describing the
dismissed and non-dismissed claims);
279. Id. at 53–54; Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl. 126, 131 (2020)
(reaffirming the decision to certify the case for an interlocutory appeal).
280. See Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 585 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), cert. granted, 141
S. Ct. 193 (2020) (allowing a non-takings claim to proceed).
281. See Solomon & Zaring, supra note 261, at 374, 377 (“We think that these lawsuits
are compelling—even if the plaintiffs are not particularly attractive . . . .”); Robert K.
Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governmental Intervention in an Economic Crisis, 19 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 7, 18 (2016) (stating that the net sweep “appeared to affect a taking of the private
investors’ investment property”).
282. See Davidson, supra note 261; see also Badawi & Casey, supra note 271, at 445
(“While wiping out equity has generated this political controversy, it is consistent with what
often happens to stockholders of distressed companies.”).
283. Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 50–55,
Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl. 126 (2020) (No. 13-465C).
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interests.284 The plaintiffs’ attorneys’ lead Supreme Court cases
therefore are physical takings cases: Loretto,285 Washington Legal
Foundation,286 and Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies.287 And they also try
to bolster their arguments with an interesting analogy: according to
the plaintiffs, redirecting dividends from a stockholder is much like
redirecting water from an irrigation ditch.288 Consequently, before
the plaintiffs even get to Lucas or Penn Central, they cite Casitas
Municipal Water District, the Federal Circuit decision discussed in
the previous section.289
This is just one brief in one set of coordinated cases—albeit a
carefully strategized brief in litigation with eleven- or twelve-figure
sums potentially at stake. But it reflects a theme, which is consistent
with the empirical data stretching across hundreds of cases. The
strategies of takings litigation have shifted, and the focus of
plaintiffs is not securing a favorable regulatory takings decision,
though they will take that if it is offered. Instead, plaintiffs’
attorneys’ goal is to find a categorical treatment that avoids a
regulatory takings analysis entirely. And if that is true, then the
most important and interesting takings battles will likely be fought
within, and at the boundaries of, the realm of physical takings.
D. The Grab Bag
So far, this Part has focused on a few case categories that
exemplify broader themes (I have not discussed all the major
categories; military overflights and flooding also generate huge
numbers of claims). But that categorical focus leaves a large grab
bag of other claims, some of which are unique or have only one or
two close cousins. This last subsection discusses whether any
thematic observations can be drawn from this collection. Any such
observation has to be caveated, for the sheer variety means that
generalizations have abundant exceptions. Nevertheless, two
notable, though far from discrete, groups do emerge, along with
some associated themes.

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 48–49.
Id. at 48 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1892)).
Id. (citing Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003)).
Id. (citing Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 162 (1980)).
Id. at 49.
Id.
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One group includes novel, creative, and relatively unique
claims arising out of unconventional types of claimed property
interests.290 To provide just a few examples, plaintiffs have argued
that the federal government took property interests in heliport
operations,291 business interests in providing airport security
services,292 compensatory mitigation credits,293 tort claims against
the Japanese government for World War II atrocities in the
Philippines,294 and state claims to unredeemed federal savings
bonds.295 In many of these cases, the financial stakes are high. In a
Japanese war crimes case, for example, the plaintiffs sought a
trillion-dollar damage award,296 and one airport’s case produced a
Court of Federal Claims decision ordering $133.5 million in just
compensation.297 From the plaintiffs’ perspective—and perhaps
from their attorneys’ perspective, if they are handling the case on
contingency-fee arrangements—the cases dangle the possibility of
enormous payoffs. But the few initially successful cases generally
have been reversed on appeals.298 Very few plaintiffs in this group
have actually won.
Besides the rarity of success, several other themes emerge from
these cases. Most strikingly, a recurring question in this group—in
addition to questions about the appropriate method of takings
analysis—is whether the assertedly taken interest even counts as
property.299 Many of the cases compel courts to consider whether
290. The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac cases also exemplify this group’s main
attributes, but I discuss them separately because they are both cutting-edge and particularly
high stakes.
291. Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
292. Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 1045.
293. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 669 F.3d 1326, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
294. See Achenbach v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 776, 776 (2003); Hair v. United States,
52 Fed. Cl. 279, 279–80 (2002).
295. Laturner v. United States, 933 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
296. Hair, 52 Fed. Cl. at 281.
297. See Love Terminal Partners, L.P. v. United States, 889 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
298. E.g., id. (reversing the Court of Federal Claims’s just compensation award).
299. E.g., Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 669 F.3d 1326, 1330–32 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); Acceptance Ins. Cos., Inc. v. United States, 583 F.3d 849, 857–59 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(holding that the plaintiffs lacked a property interest in selling crop insurance); Air Pegasus
of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1216–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that the
plaintiffs had no property interest in navigable airspace); Meyers v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl.
34, 62–64 (2010) (concluding that cattle ranchers lacked a property interest in payments from
the Conservation Security Program).

636

637

The Realities of Takings Litigation

interests in some heavily regulated field—and, sometimes, interests
created by a regulatory program—are property interests protected
by the Fifth Amendment.300 More deeply, those cases raise
questions about the origins of property; can it only have roots in
old, common-law traditions, or is it something that can be created
and extinguished by modern positive law?301 Some property
theorists have suggested the latter answer; if property is a creation
of political communities, they argue, then a democratic political
community ought to have the ability, through positive law, to
redefine the scope of property interests.302 Adopting that view does
not mean the plaintiffs would win their cases; a court still could
easily hold that there could be few reasonable investment-backed
expectations in arenas subject to heavy regulation.303 But the
Federal Circuit’s general answer, instead, is that there can be no
property interests at all in fields where heavy regulation preceded
the interest in question—like, for example, the sale of compensatory
mitigation credits generated by wetlands restoration. In contrast,
according to the Federal Circuit, such interests can exist in fields,
like the development of wetlands, which now are heavily regulated
but once were not. 304 That distinction implies that property must
be something grounded in old common law. And for many of the
300. See, e.g., Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc., 669 F.3d at 1330–32 (compensatory
mitigation credits); Acceptance Ins. Cos., Inc., 583 F.3d at 857.
301. See Michael Pappas, Disclaiming Property, 42 HARV. ENV’T. L. REV. 391, 415–16 (2018).
302. See Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1304
(2014) (describing property doctrines, many now seen as odious, that later laws have limited
or eliminated).
303. See Members of Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 421 F.3d. 1323,
1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting but not adopting this rationale).
304. See, e.g., Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc., 669 F.3d at 1332 (holding that mitigation
banking credits are not takings clause property because they are created through regulatory
programs); Members of Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n, Inc., 421 F.3d. at 1334 (“Peanut quotas are
property, but they are a form of property that is subject to alteration or elimination by
changes in the government program that gave them value.”); Mike’s Contracting, LLC v.
United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 302, 307 (2010) (holding that a plaintiff could not assert a property
right where its interest was “tied to government approval in a context of pervasive
government control”). In some subtly different cases, the Court of Federal Claims or the
Federal Circuit has declined to find a property interest because the laws governing the
program that created the interest also expressly limited the plaintiffs’ ability to do what the
plaintiff wanted to do. See, e.g., Acceptance Ins. Cos., Inc., 583 F.3d at 857–58 (“Under the
‘background principles’ and rules existing when Acceptance entered into the crop insurance
business, Acceptance could not freely transfer the policies at issue. . . . Therefore, Acceptance
did not possess a cognizable Fifth Amendment property interest in freely selling American
Growers’ portfolio of insurance policies . . . .”).
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interests created by regulation, that view means that the plaintiffs
lose without ever even getting to a Penn Central analysis.305
The second group—which has fuzzy boundaries with the first—
involves cases grounded in combinations of legal misunderstanding
and anti-governmental animus. These cases also are abundant and
come in many varieties. Some fall within traditional takings
categories; they include land use permitting cases, for example, in
which the plaintiffs appear to believe that merely being asked to
participate in a permitting process was a taking.306 Others are more
extreme, or even bizarre. To provide a few examples, plaintiffs have
sued because the federal government stopped them from building
an unpermitted dam on federal land,307 because the federal
government charges patent fees,308 because of inchoate claims
grounded in categorical opposition to taxation,309 because the
federal government allegedly stole people’s true identities at
birth,310 or under theories that the judges struggle mightily to even
understand.311 These cases invariably lose, but they are abundant
enough that one cannot just write them off as irrelevant sideshows.

305. See, e.g., Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1219 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (dismissing a claim without applying the Penn Central test).
306. See, e.g., Freeman v. United States, 875 F.3d 623, 625 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (describing a
claim brought by a miner who sued when the Forest Service asked for details about his
planned operations); Mehaffy v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 755 (2012), aff’d, 499 F. Appx. 18,
cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1124 (2014) (“While plaintiff may have expected the permitting process
to be nothing more than ‘some red tape,’ it was his responsibility to take the permitting
process seriously. He did not.”); Pax Christi Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 52
Fed. Cl. 318, 325–26 (2002) (dismissing as unripe a case in which the plaintiffs had not
responded to requests for information about their application or responded to the concerns
of other federal and state agencies).
307. Underwood Livestock, Inc. v. United States, 417 F. App’x 934, 935 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
308. E.g., Figueroa v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 488, 490 (2003).
309. E.g., Complaint at *4, Brokaw v. United States, No. 1:14-cv-00586-MCW (Fed. Cl.
July 10, 2014) (alleging that the plaintiffs were “[p]rofiled and targeted as; [sic] antigovernment, Constitutionalists, and Tax Protestors”).
310. Troxelle v. United States, 2010 WL 3982349 at *2 (Fed. Cl. 2010).
311. See, e.g., Kortlander v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 357, 359 (2012) (“Plaintiffs’
complaint is rambling, disjointed and, in many respects, it is difficult to sort relevant
information from colorful background details.”); Strubel v. United States, 2009 WL 1636355
at *1 (Fed. Cl. 2009) (“While it was clear that Mr. Strubel labored with great effort to assemble
his complaint . . . this is the only thing that was clear about the filing.”).
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*****

In summary, several key findings emerge from the numbers
and from a qualitative review of takings cases against the federal
government. Most importantly, the cases do not fit a conventional
narrative, which suggests that regulatory restrictions will generate
most of the takings cases and most of the intellectually interesting
questions. Instead, the more challenging questions that arise tend
to be about the appropriate method of analysis or the nature of
property rights, not about applications of the Penn Central or Lucas
standards. And the overall picture does not validate narratives in
which takings litigation is a central locus for clashes between
federal regulatory governance and individual liberty. Some
plaintiffs are clearly trying to bring such cases, but they almost
invariably lose, and in most cases even a brief review of their legal
arguments clarifies why they are losing. Sophisticated businesses,
meanwhile, will take occasional shots, as will large law firms; the
Fannie Mae–Freddie Mac litigation involves well-heeled clients
represented by some very prominent firms.312 But those are
outliers. For the most part, takings litigation, at least in the federal
courts, is not something in which large businesses are choosing
to participate.
V. BUSINESS MODELS AND IDEOLOGUES
The discussion so far has described federal court takings
litigation. This final Part considers, briefly, why federal takings
litigation has become what it is and whether the current status of
that litigation should be cause for concern.
One explanation for the nature of takings claims is grounded in
the calculations of businesses. To put it simply, the kind of ad-hoc,
fact-bound, and equity- and fairness-driven analyses envisioned by
governing Supreme Court standards would make most takings
litigation a rather poor business proposition, both for regulated
entities and, perhaps more importantly, for their lawyers. Two of
the Penn Central prongs demand time-consuming legal work—one
cannot demonstrate diminution in value or interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations without introducing

312. See Joe Light, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Shareholders Argue Against Government’s Profit
Sweep, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2016 (mentioning the involvement of Boies, Schiller & Flexner, LLP).
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ample evidence and, in all likelihood, retaining expert witnesses.313
While physical takings cases also require economic calculations,
they typically occur at the valuation stage, which happens after
liability has been established and the parties know the government
will be paying for the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ time.314 The other Penn
Central prong—the nature of the government action—functions as
an invitation to weigh some of the deeper equity questions
underlying takings disputes, which again means an invitation to
tell a fact-intensive story.315 Combine the evidentiary demands of
the standard with the traditionally low odds of success,316 and it is
no wonder that plaintiffs appear to avoid filing some takings cases
entirely and, when they do file, try to use categories to simplify the
analysis. Similarly, it should not be entirely surprising that many of
the cases that do not fit into any sort of category, yet are filed
anyway, either offer the temptation of a large payout or are filed by
plaintiffs apparently motivated by mixes of anti-governmental
animus and legal bewilderment.
The harder question is whether any of this is problematic. At
first glance, the answer might be no. The absence of Penn Central
claims might not seem worrisome (and does not show that Penn
Central and its progeny lack importance); if a legal standard is
deterring litigation, it may be serving a significant and appropriate
function.317 The absence of cases may also signal the extent to which
federal regulation, though far reaching, is also accommodating. If
regulated entities are getting compromises out of regulatory
processes—and many clearly are318—they may see little benefit in
313. See Meltz, supra note 159, at 336–38 (describing calculations that inform a
diminution-in-value analysis).
314. See id. at 360–62 (describing the simplified evidentiary issues in a physical invasion
liability analysis).
315. See Echeverria, supra note 94, at 186–98 (describing the wide range of inquiries that
can fall within this factor).
316. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 12, at 88 (“[I]n state court practice, relegation to ad
hoc adjudication has marked the death knell for a takings claim.”).
317. See COAN, supra note 81, at 151–54 (describing the burdens that more litigationinviting takings standards would create).
318. See Dave Owen, Little Streams and Legal Transformations, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 1, 41,
51 (2017) (describing the flexibility of Clean Water Act section 404 permitting); Eric Biber &
J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the
Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 169–73 (2014) (describing the Army Corps of Engineers’
regulatory permitting programs); Owen, supra note 229, at 182–85 (describing flexible
approaches to implementing the Endangered Species Act).
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filing takings claims. Likewise, efforts to create and place cases
within categorical boxes might also seem entirely appropriate. To a
large extent, that is the point of legal systems: they lump similar
situations into categories and govern those categories with
consistent rules, all so that disputes can be predictably and
efficiently resolved.319 And if some attorneys use those categories
to become rich, that is hardly unprecedented. For decades, tort
litigation has relied on a similar business model, with many more
attorneys and parties involved.320
The problem arises, however, if the categories are poor proxies
for the underlying justice interests that law is supposed to serve.
With the new categorical pushes in takings litigation, that threat is
real. Takings, according to the Supreme Court, ultimately is about
weighing owners’ interests in using their property as they see fit
against the needs of other property owners and of society as a
whole.321 In many cases, both sets of needs are compelling, and it is
difficult to find a simple formula for balancing them. For example,
the equitable dilemmas raised by the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
net worth sweep are not simple. The taxpayers had bailed the
companies out, at great risk and seem entitled to the benefit of the
chance they took, and the other investors knew they were buying
into a government-controlled entity;322 yet, at the same time, a
majority-shareholder action that leaves minority shareholders with
nothing strikes many people as unfair.323 These dilemmas deserve
careful thought, yet if the plaintiffs succeed in analogizing the case
to Brown v. Washington Legal Foundation and treating it as a
categorical physical takings case, these equitable questions might
not even be part of the analysis.324 The same problem arises with

319. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22, 61–66 (1992) (describing the benefits of categorical legal rules).
320. See Personal Injury Lawyers & Attorneys in the US - Market Size 2002–2027,
IBISWORLD, https://www.ibisworld.com/industry-statistics/market-size/personal-injurylawyers-attorneys-united-states/ (Aug. 16, 2021) (describing a $41.5 billion market).
321. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (describing the Takings
Clause as “designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole”).
322. See Badawi & Casey, supra note 271, at 445–46 (“The chorus of objectors . . . [to the
net worth sweep] has ignored both the enormous risk facing all creditors of the Entities and
the freedom that corporate law grants to limit this risk.”).
323. See id. at 444–45 (summarizing the diverse range of critics).
324. See supra notes 284–289 and accompanying text.
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the water rights cases. To provide one prominent example, longlasting litigation over the waters of the Klamath River involved
difficult questions about how to achieve equity among tribes,
irrigators, and environmentalists, all of whom had longstanding
claims to the same river,325 yet a physical takings analysis could
have sidelined these questions. In that particular case, the attempt
failed—the Court of Federal Claims and Federal Circuit held that
the tribes’ treaty rights precluded the irrigators from asserting a
property interest in the flows at issue.326 But in a future case that
lacks the Klamath’s distinctive treaty history, the result could be an
abundance of efficiency but very ill-considered justice.
There are also multiple ways to avoid these problems. One is
skepticism of plaintiffs’ attempts to treat regulatory restrictions as
physical takings. The Supreme Court has already counseled courts
to employ such skepticism,327 and in some cases they do.328 Another
option is to limit plaintiffs’ attempts to treat novel interests as
property. A reluctance to acquiesce to those attempts is also
recurrent in Court of Federal Claims and Federal Circuit cases,
though, as discussed above, the rationales for that reluctance beg
some difficult questions about the origins of property.329
A third option is to step away from the decades-old assumption
that the world of takings litigation is neatly split between
regulatory claims, which require ad-hoc, fact-specific analyses, and
physical takings, which require categorical analyses. And while
this change might seem at odds with the Court’s repeated
statements, the shift would be less dramatic than it initially
appears. As multiple commentators have pointed out, the Court’s
supposedly categorical tests have always been riddled with
exceptions.330 And more recently, the Court has set a
non-categorical test for an entire category—and, by the numbers,
an important category—of physical takings claims. In Arkansas
325. See generally HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH
BASIN: MACHO LAW, COMBAT BIOLOGY, AND DIRTY POLITICS (2008) (describing the Klamath
basin’s history of water conflict).
326. Baley v. United States, 942 F.3d 1312, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
327. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Auth., 535 U.S. 302,
323–24 (2002).
328. See, e.g., Seiber v. United States, 364 F.3d 1356, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting a
claim that regulatory protections of spotted owls affected a physical taking).
329. See supra notes 299–305 and accompanying text.
330. See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 31, at 763–75; Blais, supra note 31, at 59–65.
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Game & Fish Commission v. United States,331 a landmark flooding
case, the Court rejected the position, which the United States had
successfully asserted before the Federal Circuit, that a temporary
flood can never be a taking.332 It then offered a standard for deciding
when such a taking had occurred.333 In contrast to the Court’s
frequent statements that physical takings require per se standards,
the flooding standard demands a multipart and contextual inquiry;
the time of the flooding, its foreseeability, the extent to which it
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the
severity of its impacts all are relevant.334 If courts wish to engage
the justice questions underlying takings claims, rather than
indulging plaintiffs’ requests for new categorical boxes, that
standard provides a model.
CONCLUSION
Disputes over the appropriate scope and intensity of regulatory
governance are central to American politics and law. And lawyers
tend to assume that most takings cases arise from those disputes
and, relatedly, that takings cases play important roles within those
disputes. The empirical data summarized in this study show that
those assumptions are wrong, at least for federal regulation. Most
federal regulatory programs are largely untouched by takings
litigation; most major businesses and law firms are not using
takings litigation to address their differences with federal
regulators; and the vast majority of the inverse condemnation
claims against the federal government arise out of alleged physical,
not regulatory, takings. Likewise, in federal court takings litigation,
thorny questions do recur, but they relate to the boundaries
between modes of takings analysis and the nature of nontraditional property rights more often than the nuances of
regulatory takings standards. These conclusions do not suggest
that regulatory takings doctrine is inconsequential; it likely plays
an influential role by deterring claims. The core point, instead, is
that takings litigation looks quite different—and different in

331.
332.
333.
334.

568 U.S. 23 (2012).
Id. at 38.
Id. at 38–39.
Id. (citing Penn Central, among other cases).
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interesting and important ways—outside the spotlights of Supreme
Court and academic discourse.
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APPENDIX 1: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT TAKINGS CASES
SINCE 1978
Case Name

Date

Plaintiff

Defendant

Takings

type

type

Type

Single

Local

Regulatory

Test

General
Subject
Matter

Penn Cent.

1978

Transp. Co. v.

company

Land
development

N.Y.C., 438
U.S. 104
Andrus v.

1979

Individual

Federal

Regulatory

Allard, 444

Eagle
feathers

U.S. 51
Kaiser Aetna,

1979

444 U.S. 164

Single

Federal

Physical

company

Navigational
servitude
(related to
land and
water use)

Agins v. City

1980

Individual

Local

Regulatory

of Tiburon, 447

Land
development

U.S. 255
PruneYard

1980

Shopping Ctr.

Single

State

Physical

company

Requirement
to allow

v. Robins, 447

speech in a

U.S. 74

shopping
mall

Webb’s

1980

Fabulous

Single

State

Physical

company

Interpleader
accounts

Pharmacies,
Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155
San Diego Gas

1981

& Elec. v. City

Single

Local

Regulatory

company

Land
development

of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621
Hodel v. Va.
Surface Mining

1981

Industry

Federal

Regulatory

Coal mining

association

& Reclamation
Ass’n, 452 U.S.
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264
Dames &

1981

Company

Federal

Unclear

Moore v.

Claims
against Iran

Regan, 453 U.S.
654
Loretto v.

1982

Individual

Local

Physical

Cable

Teleprompter

television

Manhattan

boxes

CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419
United States

1982

v. Sec. Indus.

Individual

Federal

Regulatory

company

Bankruptcy
obligations

Bank, 459 U.S.
70
Ruckelshaus v.

1984

Company

Federal

Regulatory

Monsanto Co.,

Trade secrets
(pesticides)

467 U.S. 986
Williamson

1985

Cnty. Reg’l

Single

Local

Regulatory

company

Land
development

Plan. Comm’n
v. Hamilton
Bank of
Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172
Connolly v.

1986

Pension Ben.

Multiple

Federally-

entities

created

Guar. Corp.,

Regulatory

Regulation of
pension plans

corporation

475 U.S. 211
MacDonald,

1986

Company

Local

Regulatory

Sommer &

Land
development

Frates v. Yolo
Cnty., 477 U.S.
340
Bowen v.

1986

State, Public

Public

employees

Agencies

organization

Opposed to
Soc. Sec.
Entrapment,
477 U.S. 41
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Federal

Lack of property

Social

interest

Security

647
FCC v. Fla.
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1987

Company

Federal

Physical taking

Cable

Power Corp.,

claimed;

companies’

480 U.S. 245

regulatory

access to

taking analysis

utility poles

used
Keystone

1987

Bituminous

Coal

State

Regulatory

Coal mining

Local

Regulatory

Land

companies

Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470
First Eng.

1987

Church

Evangelical

development

Church of
Glendale v.
Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 482
U.S. 304
Nollan v. Cal.

1987

Individuals

State

Exaction

Coastal Com’n,

Land
development

483 U.S. 825
Hodel v.

1987

Individual

Federal

Regulatory

Inheritance of

Irving, 481 U.S.

tribe

individually

704

members

owned
Indian lands

Pennell v. City

1988

Individual,

of San Jose, 485

landlords’

U.S. 1

association

United States

1989

Corporations

Local

Regulatory

Rent control

Federal

Court upholds

User fees for

v. Sperry

fee as a valid

processing

Corp., 493 U.S.

user fee

claims

52
Preseault v.

against Iran
1990

Individuals

Federal

ICC, 494 U.S. 1
Yee v. City of

Claim dismissed

Rails to trails

as premature
Physical taking

Rent control

Escondido, 503

1992

Multiple
mobile home

Local

claims;

(mobile

U.S. 519

park owners

regulatory

homes)

takings analysis
used
Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal

1992

Individual

State

Regulatory

Land
development
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Council, 505
U.S. 1003
Concrete Pipe

1993

& Products of

Individual

Federal

Regulatory

company

Retirement
benefit

Ca., Inc. v.

obligations

Constr.
Laborers
Pension Tr.,
508 U.S. 602
Dolan v. City

1994

Individual

Local

Exaction

of Tigard, 512

Land
development

U.S. 374
Suitum v.

1997

Individual

Local

Regulatory

Tahoe Reg’l

Land
development

Plan. Agency,
520 U.S. 725
E. Enters. v.

1998

Apfel, 524 U.S.

Individual

Federal

Regulatory

company

Coal miners’
retirement

498

health
benefits

Phillips v.

1998

Individuals

Wash. Legal

and

Found., 524

organization

State

Physical

IOLTA
accounts

U.S. 156
City of

1999

Monterey v.

Single

Local

Regulatory

company

Land
development

Del Monte
Dunes at
Monterey,
Ltd., 526 U.S.
687
Palazzolo v.

2001

Individual

State

Regulatory

Rhode Island,

Land
development

533 U.S. 606
Tahoe-Sierra

2002

Pres. Council

Landowner

Local/

organization

interstate

Individuals

State

Regulatory

Land
development

v. Tahoe Reg’l
Plan. Agency,
535 U.S. 302
Brown v. Legal
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2003

Physical

IOLTA
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Found. of

funding

Wash., 538 U.S.
216
Lingle v.

2005

Corporation

State

Regulatory

Chevron USA,

Gasoline
pricing

Inc., 544 U.S.
528
San Remo

2005

Hotel, L.P. v.

Single

Local

Regulatory

business

Hotel room
conversion

City and Cnty.

fees

of San
Francisco, 545
U.S. 323
Stop the Beach

2010

Property

State

Physical/judicial

Beach

Renourishment

owners’

augmentation

v. Fla. Dept. of

association

program

Env’t Prot., 560
U.S. 702
Ark. Game &

2012

State

Federal

Physical

Flooding

2013

Individual

Local

Exaction

Land

Fish
Commission v.
United States,
568 U.S. 23
Koontz v. St.
Johns River

(regional)

development

Water Mgmt.
Dist., 570 U.S.
595
Horne v. U.S.

2013

Dept. of Agric.,

Farming

Federal

businesses

No takings test

Raisin pricing

applied

systems

Physical

Raisin pricing

569 U.S. 513
Horne v. U.S.

2015

Dept. of Agric.,

Farming

Federal

businesses

systems

576 U.S. 350
Murr v.

2017

Family

Wisconsin, 137

State and

Regulatory

local

Land
development

S. Ct. 1933
Knick v. Twp.

2019

Individual

Local

Regulatory

Land use

of Scott, Pa.,
139 S. Ct. 2162
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Cedar Point
Nursery v.
Hassid, 141
S. Ct. 2063

650

2021

Single
company

State
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Physical

Union
organizing

